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Summary findings
Almost b) defiaition, the basis for development is  The literature has made son.C  advances in diagnosing
infrastructure  -whether  services for human  these problems in poor cov ntries and preposing
infrastructure (health, education,  nutrition) or physical  solutions. But information  gaps remain, particularly in
infrastructUre (transport,  energy, water).  developing robust methodologies for:
Although the infrastructture sectors are diverse, what  *  Making intersectoral comparisons across the wide
they have in common is that public policy has had a great  range of infrastructure services.
deal to do with how these services are provided and  *  Crafting more diverse policies about the public-
financed in almnost  all countries. Jimenez reviews the  private balance in infrastructure investment, depending
recent literature on tV o key aspects of that involvement:  on the nature of "public goods" characteristics for
investmenlt  and pricinig.  various  types of infrastructure  serviccs,  or even  across
While the quality of the econometric evidence varies,  activities for the same service (for example, power
recent literature  reir'orces  the view that human and  transmission versus distribution).
physical infrastructure are critical for economic growth  * Taking issues of political econom)  into account,
and the reduction of poverty. And the state is recognized  such as the vested interests of those with large financial
as playing a key role in ensuring the efficient, equitable  interests in infrastructure.
allocation of resources for infrastructure.  Jimenez also highlights public pricing as a policy
Despite many sound thforetical  reasons for such public  initiative thaz has recently gotten much attention. After
involvement, however, recent studies have shown that it  briefly reviewing the basic concepts of pricing, he focuses
leaves much to be desired in efficiency and equity. One  on the literature about pricing reform. Most commonly,
symptom is underinvestment in key subsectors that have  the public sector is the main provider Gf  infrastructure
high economic returns and that help the poor the most,  services, usually free or at subsidized prices. But the
such as primary education and rural health clinics, in  recent literature  has aired a rethinking of the balance
relation to more expensive interventions, such as tertiary  between public and private financing of infrastructure.
education and urban hospitals. Another common malaise  T'.e debate in this area is often heated. Health and
is the poor use of scarce resources, leading to low quality  education are traditionally provided free and some recent
(students learning little) and reliability (irregular power  literature argues for positive prices, at least for higher
and water flows), poor  maintenance (dilapidated roads),  tiers of service. The principle of public pricing has been
and inappropriate  input ase (too many school  more widely accepted in transport,  energy, anid to a
administrators or health workers and not enough books  lesser extent water, but often the levels are too low and
or drugs in producing education health outcomes). Just  do not provide the appropriate incentives for efficient
as market failures necessitate government intervention in  and equitable use.
the infrastructure sectors, so government failures should
be considered in deciding the depth  and extent of that
intervention.
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Public Investment and Pricina Policies in Dev.loinca Countries
1.  Introduction and Overview
Almost by definition, infrastructure is the basis for development.'  For
an economy, it is the foundation on which the factors of production interact
in order to produce output.  This has been long recognized by development
analysts, and infrastructure, often termed "social ovrrhead capital," is
considered to include:
...those services without which primary, secondary and tertiary
production activities cannot function.  In its wider sense it includes
all public services from law and order through education and public
health to transportation, communications, power and water supply, as
well as such agricultural overhead capital as irrigation and drainage
systems (Hirschman, 1958, p. 83)
These seemingly diverse services share some common traits that are
important in economic analysis.  They are generally not tradeable.  Although
they may affect final consumption directly, their role in enhancing output and
household welfare can also be indirect --  in facilitating market transactions
or in making other economic inputs more productive.  Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the many infrastructure services share characteristics, such as
scale eccnomies in production, consumption externalities and non-exclusivity,
that have been used to justify a large role for public policy in their
provision and financing.
This chapter will focus not only on what has traditionally been
considered the "core" infrastructure sectors, which enhance the productivity
of physical capital and land (mainly transportation and power).  It will also
include human infrastructure --  or those services that raise the productivity
of labor (health,  education, nutrttion).  This is a broadening of the
definition that was given great prominence by Schultz (1963) and Becker (1964)
and that has since been widely accepted by both scholars and practitioner.
'The  dictionary's  definition  of  "infrastructure"  is  "the  underlying
foundation or basic  framework".  See Webster's  Ninth Colleoiate Dictionary,
1985,p. 621.2
Public investment will be defined broadly to include all government
spending in these sectors, rather than just capital expenditures as
traditionally defined in official statistics.  This is to ensure that tha
economic issues regarding recurrent as well as capital spending are covered,
since both have been the focus of the recent literature.  Moreover, the
chapter will emphasize recent policy debates, but will not present in detail
the basic theoretical concepts underlying them.  These can be obtained from
standard public finance textbooks, and appropriate references will be made
when necessary.  There have been some recent shifts in emphasis on the
analytic approach to infrastructure --  such as a greater focus on the
efficiency of use, rather than on construction, and an ir'reased role for
private sector participation in providing infrastructure services.  But the
most dramatic advances have been made have been in the way the concepts are
applied to the particular circumstances of developing countries. 2
Because of its wide coverage, this chapter will stress the following
common cross-sectoral themes regarding the pricing of and investment in
infrastructure services in developing countries, rather than detailed issues
within  sectors:
m  Recent studies at both the macro and micro level have reinforced
the point that investments in human and physical infrastructure
are critical elements for economic growth and for reducing
poverty, although there has been less consensus on the magnitude
of that effect (Section 2).
*  While the literature continues to accept the key role of
government in investment policy, there has been more of a debate
about the nature of that role in order to improve efficiency and
equity.  There are two key questions:  (1)  how much and what type
of service should be provided?  and (2) what is the appropriate
public-private balance in providing it?  (Section 3).
2For  example, two of the  World Bank's influential  World Develooment Reports
have been on Health (1993) and Infrastructure (1994).3
Given  that  the government  has  decided  where  to invest,  how should
these  investments  be financed? Section  4 shows  that  the recent
literature  has  been reconsidering  pricing  policy  so that it can
play a  greater  role  in financing.
The  paper  will  then sum  up briefly  and  then  discus  areas  where future
research  will  be necessary,  both  in  terms  of substance  and  of the  data  needed
to undez'take  that  research  (Section  5).
2.  The  Role  of Infrastructur,  in  the  Develonsent  Process
There  are  two  types  of evidence  regarding  the  contribution  that
infrastructure  makes  to development. Aggregate  evidence  at the country,
regional  or sectoral  level  has  most  often  been  used  to show  how infrastructure
can  affect  economic  indicators,  such  as levels  and  growth  of output. There
has  also  beern  some  work on the impact  that  infrastructure  has had  on aggregate
social  indicators.  Micro  evidence  is  used  to depict  how infrastructure
influences  household  or individual  welfare  (human  infrastructure)  and  the
profitability  of firms  (physical  infrastructure).
This section  reviews  this  evidence,  but  the  discussion  will  be succinct
and selective. The  literature  is  large  and  cross-references  will  be used  to
direct  the reader  to more detailed  reviews  (some  of  which  are  published  in
this  Handbook  or in its  earlier  editions). Also,  the  discussion  will  not
focus on the differential impacts of publicly --  or privately --  provided
infrastructure,  since  this  will be the  subject  of the  later  sections  regarding
policy.
Natlonal  and  Cross-country  3vidence
A key  question  is  whether  variations  in  national  economic  growth  and
aggregate  indices  of welfare  can  be explained  by (and  attributed  to)  changes
or differences  in infrastructure  variables. Before  reviewing  the  empirical
evidence,  a brief  overview  of the  underlying  concepts  might  be useful.4
Infrastructure can c^natribute  to output directly as a measurable final
product.  Medical staff and hospitals combine to provide curative services
that are valued for consumption and that improve a nation's social indicators.
Buses and drivers combine with highways to provide passenger transport
services.3
But its inore  important contribution may be indirect.  As an intermediate
input, it enhances the productivity of all inputs in producing output.4  The
quality of labor is enhanced by human capital improvements such as schooling.
Phyaical capital and land are made more product.a.'e  by investments that.
facilitate the transport of goods or the provision of power.
Moreover, as has recently been argued in the "new growth" economic
literature, these indirect effects can give rise to externalities, which, if
taken into account in investment decisions, can cause long-run growth to
accelerate.3  The more celebrated theoretical contributions have focused on
human capital, although similar types of externalities are posited for
physical capital.  Romer (1986, 1990) argues that technological innovation,
which is produced by human capital, is a public good so that private capital
investment increases the level available to all entrepreneurs.  Lucas (1988)
emphasizes the externality associated with prlvate investment in human capital
--  because one worker increases the prod  .ivity  of others (as  well as his or
3For  example, gas, water and electricity are included as industrial sectors
in  national  accounts  calculations,  while  transport  and  communications  are
included as  service  sectors --  together their  combined  share in GDP varies
between 5-11 percent in most countries (Kessides, 1993).
'Formally,  infrastructure's direct and indirect effects can be represented
(Hulten and Schwab, 1991) as:
(1)  Yt  =  A(It,  t) *  f(K,,  L,,  T,,  I,),
where output  (Y) is determined by physical capital (K), labor (L), land (T),
infrastructure  (I) and technical progress  (A) through  a twice-differentiable
function f(.) and t  is a time variable that allows for other differences in
productive  efficiency.  Equation  (1)  varies  from  standard  neoclassical
formulations because of the effect of infrastructure investment in affecting
A(.).  Even  if f(.) exhibits constant returns to  scale inclusive of  I, the
presence of I in the technical progress term gives rise to externalities, as
suggested by recent proponents of the "new growth" literature.
5Chapter 41  by  Lau  in  this  volume  contains  a  thorough  review  of  the
theoretical and empirical literature.5
her own) in the process of interaction. 6 Becker et al. (1990) discumses
increasing returns to human capital because investing in the quality of
children has higher returns when human capital is abundant relative to
investments in quantity. 7 These models assume that, because of externalities,
factor returns do not necessarily dimini  ;. Thus, increasing investment can
accelerate economic growth --  hence the term, "endogenous growth".
In contrast, the neoclassical formulations associated with Solow (1956)
invoked the simplifying assumptions of constant returns to scale, diminishing
factor returns and the exogenous nature of the factors themselves to obtain
closed form solutions. 8 These assumptions assured that all countries will
converge  to  the  same  exogenously-determined  steady  state  growth  path  --  a
characteristic  that  is  difficult  to  support  empirically.
Ultimately,  the  validity  of  the  competing  theories  rests  on  empirical
work.  What is the aggregate evidence regarding growth, investment and social
outcomes?
Growth and human capital.  The early aggregate studies using growth
accounting methods (Denison, 1967, Kendrick, 1976) measured the contribution
of variables that enhance the productivity of the measured inputs (like
education) to the average annual rate of growth by inferring it from the
residual of a growth equation, after the growth of labor and capital are taken
itxto  account.  In education, for example, a review (Psacharopoulos, 1984)
concluded that, although the quantitative results were widely disparate across
'None  of these arguments are particularly  new, as is  admitted by most of the
recent  authors,  many  of  whom  formalize  ideas posited  by  earlier  authors.
Selowsky (1992)  makes this point forcefully.  Romer's (1986) ideas are close to
those of Arrow (1962)  and Phelps (1966)  on learning by doing, while Lucas (1988)
builds on Uzawa's (1962)  work on increasing  the returns that arise from external
effects associated  with human capital. What is  innovative is  that they are being
used in formal models of economic growth with closed form solutions.
7Summers (1992) and Gill and Bhalla  (1992) extend this  argument to the
importance  of female human  capital by stressing  the positive association  between
the education of women and better health and greater enrollment of children in
school.
"These assumptions  lead to  the  "convergence"  hypothesis.  Diminishing
returns and the diffusion of technology guarantee that all countries will have
the same steady-rate of economic growth.countries,  qualitatively  education  had  a  positive  effect  on growth. But  theme
studies  were  rooted  in  the neoclassical  formulations  of the  8010w-type  growth
models  and failed  to isolate  the effects  of the possible  externalities
mentioned  above.
Another  approach  that allows  for  possible  externalities  comes  from
econometric  analysis  of the  relationship  between  output  levels  or growth  and
human  infrastructure  variakles  from  historical  and  cross-section  data.  This
link  has  been  reviewed  in several  chapters  of this  Handbook  --  Birdsall  on
population  (Chapter  12),  Schultz  on education  ("hapter  13),  Behrmana  and
Deolalikar  on health  and  nutrition  (Chapter  14)  and  Lau  on general  issues
(Chapter  41)  --  as well  as other  recent  papers  (for  example,  Behrman,  1990bs
Weale,  1992  and  Easterly  at al.  1992). These  reviews  have  generally  found
that,  while  there  is some  evidence  that  human  resources  contribute  to growth,
there  is lass  consensus  on the  importance  of that contribution  --  both  with
respect  to its  magnitude  and  its  nature  (whether  the externalities  are
pecuniary  or technical). For  example,  two studies  of about  100  countries  find
that a 10  percent  increase  in secondary  school  enrollment  rates  is associated
with an increase  in  the  growth  rate  of GDP  per  capita  of 0.2  percent  (Barro
1991)  and  0.7  percent  (Baumol  et al.,  1989;  see  Weale,  .992  for  further
comparisons).
The apparent  lack  of empirical  consensus  concerns  important  measurement
and  methodological  problems  that  are  only  slowly  being  resolved. One set  of
issues  has  to do with obtaining  an appropriate  measure  of human  capital  as an
explanator-  variable. This  complexity  can  be lllustrated  for  the case  of
education,  where  data are  arguably  more readily  available  than  in other
infrastructure  sectors. Popular  measures  used in  numerous  early  studies  are
school  enrollment  ratios  and  adult  literacy  rates (for  example,  Romer,  1990).
These  variables  may  not  capture  the  contribution  of changes  in  the
directly-measured  stocks  of human  capital. School  enrollment  ratios  refer  to
flows  of schooling,  which  may be inappropriate  since  there  are  usually  long
time lags  before  the  results  of the  educational  process  emerge;  and adult
literacy  rates  capture  only  a  very  early  stage  of human  capital  formation  that
does  not include  numeracy,  reasoning  and  other  aspects  that  may  have  a major7
impact cn productivity.  Both measures, which are typically obtained by U.N.
specialized agencies from surveys of developing country institutions, also
produce data of doubtful quality because of non-comparability across nations
as well as a lack of monitoring on the production of the numbers.
More recently, census survey data have been used to construct measures
of educational attainment.  Foi.  example, Psacharopoulos and Arriagada  (1986)
use census-based data to compile the total educational stock of the labor
force for 99 countries (although  only 34 have more than one observation).  Lau
et al. (1991)  takes a slightly different approach in using annual enrollment
figures in a perpetual inventory model to estimate stocks of educational
attainment for the working-age population.  Barro and Lee (1993)  uses cansus-
based data (for 129 countries, 77 of which have three or more observations) as
a benchmark and then combines them with enrollment ratios to estimate the
educational attainment of the overall population aged 25 and above.  While
these studies are able to resolve the stock-flow issue, the data they use are
still subject to criticism on quality grounds because: the enrollment ratios
contain substantial measurement error; they are not sensitive to completion
and retention rate differences across countries; and the interpolation
techniques to fill in missing data points may not be duly sensitive to
individual country conditions.  This may be one reason why the results tend to
be sensitive to what is included in the regression equations, which remain
surprisingly ad hoc, in relation to the elegant theoretical models on which
they are based.
The measurement issue also affects studies that attempt to use health,
nutrition and population outcomes.9  Available aggregate demographic and
health data are notoriously incomplete, and are difficult to compare because
of varying definitions.  The UN's Demographic Yearbook distinguishes between
"reliable" and "other" statistics by using italics.  The World Bank's 1993
World DeveloDment Report explicitly highlights estimates based on old data,
models and other approximations.  The quality of the data is improving due to
better collection methods and the availability of new data, such as from the
9I  am grateful to Ken Hill for his help in this assessment.a
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)  sponsored by USAID, although census
coverage -till leaves much to be desired.  Data regarding child mortality and,
to a lesser degree, total fertility are considered to be of better quality
than data regarding adult mortality, which are very incomplete.
Another set of issues has to do with technical concerns about the
estimation.  Most important is the concern about simultaneity.  Aggregate
output and its growth can obviously affect many of the human capital variables
that are used as explanatory variables.1 0 Early attempts by Wheeler (1980)  to
correct for simultaneity suffered from a lack of instruments (soe  Behrman
1990b).  Recent studies with access to more and better quality data have been
able to argue that some of the variables used are indeed exogenous because of
the way the lagged relationships are modeled (Barro and Lee 1993).  Still,
even these studies are criticized because of concerns that some variables may
have been o..ttted,  such as the effect of environmental variables on health
outcomes and continued measurement error in the variables for which data do
exist.
Growth and nhvsical capital.  The evidence on the link between physical
infrastructure and growth is more diffuse and is only beginning to be reviewed
(see, for example, Kessides, 1993).  The nature of infrastructure services is
much more variable, and it is difficult to develop aggregate measures of
physical capital analogous to indicators of the human condition.  Aggregate
infrastructure (which is usually a combination of diverse sectors like
transport and communications and some components of the "economic services"
category of the national accounts) has shown that there can be a substantial
positive effect.  Aschauer's (1989) study of the U.S. evidence, using a
producticn function approach, indicates that the contribution of basic
infrastructure services is very large.
But such single-country studies over time are difficult to replicate in
developing countries because of data constraints.  Lakshaman and Elhance
(1984) show that transport and power have a positive effect on industrial
I 0 Indeed,  as is  evident below,  there is a  whole literature  about how national
income determines  socio-economic  indicators  such  as  educational  and  health
outcomes, which are often the same variables used as proxies for human capital.9
production  in India. Amcig  the  few  other  studies  in developing  countries,  one
for  Mexico  (using  a restricted  cost-function  approach)  finds  that  there  is
some  evidence  that  public  physical  infrastructure  make both labor  and  capital
inputs  more productive  (Shah  1992),  although  the  rate  of return  is lower  than
that for  p;ivate  capital.
Cross-country  evidence  does  exist  that links  a variety  of specific
infrastructure  outcomes  with  growth  or other  measures  of overall  economic
performance. Table  1  cites  some  aggregate  evidence  of the  results  mentioned
above  for  agriculture,  the  sector  in  which  the  coverage  of data is  probably
best.  Roads  and  road  density  have  a strong  positive  effect  on agricultural
output. Irrigation  also  has  a significant  effect  on aggregate  output.
Tabe  1: Effects of Infrastructure on Agriculture: Cross-country  Evidence"
Due to 1  % increase  In  Increase  of Aggregate Crop Output(%
Irrigation  1.62*
Paved roads  .26*
Rural road density  .12*
Adult literacy rate  .54
*  Statistically  significant  at 10%.
L  Cross-country  study - 58 countries.
Source:  Binswanger,  H. (1990)
Other  variables  that  have  been  used  in  cross-country  analysis  include:
telephone  coverage  per  capita  (Hardy  and  Hudson,  1981)  and  the  extent  of paved
road networks  (Querioz,  1992). These  have  been shown  to be significant  in
explaining  differences  in  GDP  per capita  across  countries. One study  finds
that an indicator  of spending  on  transport  and communications  services  has  a
significant  effect  on some  categories  of sectoral  output,  such  as agricultural
productivity  (Antle,  1983). Manufacturing  investment  is  also found  to depend
on infrastructure  quality  (Wheeler  and  Mody,  1991). These  studies  found
strong  correlations  between  lagged  values  of these  variables  and  GDP  per10
capita, but econometric problems may persist as the lag structures may not
fully account for simultaneity.
Studies that use physical measures of capital, such as those cited
above, are few.  A more popular approach is to use data on the shares that
each sector (typically transportation and communication, but also of gas,
water and electricity) contributes to total output (World Bank, 1987b) or to
public spending (Devarajan et al., 1992; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993) as
explanatory variables of per capital GDP levels or growth.  Most of these
studies suffer from many of the same econometric and measurement problems
described above for human infrastructure.  For example, they cannot control
adequately for simultaneity, so that the causality between economic growth and
the provision of infrastructure is not clear.  Moreover, many of the studies
cannot be used directly for policy analysis because the sector definitions are
too broad or because they do not consider variations in quality or
utilization.
Interpretation of the results is also  a concern.  First, using overall
sectoral shares confounds the differential effects of public and private
spending, making it nearly impossible to derive clear policy implications.
Correcting for this may be difficult since data on private spending are scarce
and many private infrastructure utilities receive large amounts of public
subsidies.  Moreover, it is critical not to lump together wasteful
infrastructure "white elephants" with productive investments.  Second, studies
that rely on public spending patterns may not capture the true effect of
infrastructure if there is widespread waste in spending (see  Devarajan et al.,
1992).
Another way to measure the impact of public infrastructure investment
on development is to consider its effect on private investment.  Studies using
data from developing countries (see reviews in Chhibber and Dailami, 1990;
Serven and Solimano, 1992) indicate that public infrastructure investment
"crowds in" private investment, while the opposite is true for non-
infrastructure investment.  These points are discussed in the next section on
investment policy.11
Social  indicators  and  infrastructurs.  Levels  and  growth  of aggrogate
output  measure  only  one  aspect  of overall  economli  development. Another
important  set  of indicators  is the  direct  measure  of health  and social
variables.  For an in-depth  discussLon  on the reasons  for  distinguishing
between  these  two aspects,  see  the  chapter  by Lipton  and  Ravallion  (Chapter
42).
Aggregate  data have  been  used  to illustrate  that social  indicators
have  been improving  over  time (World  Bank,  1990;  Kakwanl,  1992).  Infant
mortality  rates  have  been  dropping,  although  Kakwani  (1992)  finds  that  the
progress  made  by the low-income  countries,  which  was superior  to that  made by
middle-income  countries  until  the  mid-1970s,  seems  to have lost  momentum  in
subsequent  periods. Literacy  rates  have shown  a strong  upward  trend,
consistent  with  the  parallel  gains  in  primary  school  enrollment  rates.
Moreover,  policy  documents  have loosely  used  broad  correlations  to show  that
access  to infrastructure,  particularly  social  services  and  water,  has  had  much
to  do with these  gains. One such  example  is  the  World  Bank's  1990  Wcrld
Develooment  Re2ort:
"In  1985,  spending  on primary  education  as a percentage  of GNP  was
more  than four  times  higher  in  Botswana,  where  the  enrollment  rate  was
99 percent,  than in  Haiti,  where  it  was  only  55 percent. Similarly,
in countries  that  have achieved  broad  provision  of health  care,  such
as Chile  and  Mauritius,  spending  as a percentage  of GNP is several
times  greater  than in  countries  such  as India  and  Pakistan,  where
under  5 mortality  remains  exceptionally  high  and  the  percentage  of
children  immunized  is low"  (p.  46).
While  intuitively  appealing,  these  contentions  cannot  be considered  to
be rigorous  evidence  of the  impact  of infrastructure  on social  indicators.
The quality  of the  data  on aggregate  educational  and  health  outcomes  has
already  been  discussed  above. Moreover,  there  is  the  taxing  question  of
simultaneity --  it is likely  that  educational  outcomes,  for  example,  proxy
for  overall  levels  of economic  development  and  can  equally  explain  the  amount
of investment  countries  can  afford  to make.  Flnally,  questLons  about  the
efficacy  of public  investment  can  be raLsed  because  there  ar-  typically  no
controls  in  these  studies  for  differences  in  quality.12
Conclusions.  The positive link between measures of infrastructure and
development is fairly robust across studies and methodologies.  However, it is
more difficult to pin down the quantitative evidence regarding this impact,
particularly that of aggregate measures of physical infrastructure (see
Polenake and Rockler 1993).  This is because of the difficulty in measuring
and deriving a precise methodology that clearly defines causality between
infrastructure outcomes and development measures.  Consequently, while such
studies are useful for raising overall consciousness about the importance of
infrastructure, they are less useful for guiding policy.  Moreover, even if
the measurement and methodology questions were addressed, policy instruments
at the aggregate level are often difficult to interpret.  This is because of
the need to differentiate between publicly - versus privately - provided
capital.  The studies that do differentiate in this way rely on spending data,
but such spending may not lead to great improvements in the physical capital
stock if they are not done efficiently; also they measure flows and not stocks
of  capital.
Microeconomic Links
The uneven nature of the aggregate evidence has meant that much more
of  the burden of documenting the effects of infrastructure on productivity has
rested on microeconomic data at the individual or enterprise level.  This
evidence also has a direct bearing on the question of what effect
infrastructure has on poverty reduction since increasing productivity is one
of the principal ways for the poor to escape poverty and since many of the
studies also focus on poorer households and smaller firms.
Direct effects of human capital.  The link between human resources and
productivity has been the subject of a large number of studies, particularly
in education, health and nutrition, which is only briefly summarized in what
follows."
"See BehrmaA (1990a) for a more thorough review of these issues.  Some of
these ideas also arise in  the context of the discussions in  previous chapters of
this Handbook  by  Strauss and Thomas  in this volume, Behrman  and Deolalikar
(Chapter 14) and Schultz (Chapter 13).13
Much of the microeconomic evidence comes from studying the impact of
education on wages.  Studies (mainly using earnings functions) consistently
find that there is a large labor market premium on attaining additional years
or levels of schooling.  Table 2 shows the magnitude of this impact for a
number of countries.  When compared to the costs of obtaining that education,
many conventional estimates put these rates of return at levels that are
typically above those of physical rates of return (Peacharopoulos, 1985).
There estimates, summarized in Table 3 as averages of individual studies, also
reveal that returns to education tend to be highest for basic levels.  Many of
these studies have been criticized for a number of valid reasons, such as the
possibility that these returns to education are due to credentialism, the
inability to control for quality (Behrman and Birdsall, 1983), the possibility
that the returns may have been dropping over time, and their failure tj
control for inter-regional differences.  While some of these corrections could
cause a decline in some of the estimates (particularly in the returns to
expanding primary education versus improving its quality), in general, the
general qualitative results and supporting evidence have been taken very
seriously in policy advice.14
Tabe 22: The Effet  of an Addilonal Year of Schoolhng  on Wages and
Farm Output, Selected Countris and Years
Percentage
Increase
In wages  Percentage
Increase  In
Male  Female  fann  output
C6te d'Ivoire, 1987  12 P
21 S
Ghana, 1988/89  5
Korea, Rep. of, 1976, 1974  6  2
Indonesia, 1986  8  12 S
France, 1987  11
Peru, 1986  13 P  12P  3
8 S  8S
Malaysia, 1987  16  18  5
Nicaragua (urban), 1985  10  13
Philippines, 1980  18
Spain, 1979  10
Thailand, 1986; 1973  17 P  13 P  3
7S  25S
United States, 1967
Whites  6  7
Blacks  5  11
P = primary school level.
S = primary school level.
Note:  These results were all estimated  controlling  for other factors  such as work experiedce  and other
individual  characteristics. In most cases, the estiriated effects have also been corrected for any
statistical  bias resulting  from selecting  a sample  of wage earners only.  The estimates  for C6te
d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Korea pertain to combined  samples  of men and women.
Source: Studies quoted  in World Bank, 1991.1S
Tbie 3:  Returns  to Investment  in Education,  by Country  Type  and  Lewi
Social  Private  Number
Region  Primay  Seconday  Higher  Primay  Secondary  Higher  reporting
Africa  28  17  13  45  26  32  16
Asia  27  15  13  31  15  18  10
Latin America  26  18  16  32  23  23  10
Europe, Middle  East
and North A.rica  13  10  8  17  13  13  9
Developing  Countries  24  15  13  31  19  22  45
Note:  Private returns take into account  only the cost of education  to the individual. In contrast, social
retrnis are based on the full cost of education  to society, but as they do not attempt to measure
social benefits, they are necessarily  lower.
Source:  Psacharopoulos  (1985).
There  is  also  evidence  from  the  non-wage  sector.  Educated  farmers  are
more likely  to adopt  new  technologies,  and  virtually  all  studies  on  agricultural
productivity  show  that  better-educated  farmers  get  a higher  return  on their  land.
Studies  of Africa,  for  example,  have found  that farmers  who have  completed  four
years  of education  (the  minimum  many analysts  conclude  is necessary  for literacy)
produce,  on average  about  8  percent  more  than farmers  who have  not  gone  to school
(Jamison  and  Lau, 1982). Similar  positive  effects  have  been found  in studies  in
Korea,  Malaysia  and  Thailand  (see  references  in  Behrman  1990a). Although  there  is
not  as  much evidence  that schooling  improves  informal  sector  employment  and
earnings  in the  rural  non-agricultural  sector,  some  studies  --  includlng  one  of
family  businesses  in  Peru  --  show  that  the  more  education  a person  has  had,  the
wider  the  range  of possibilities  that is  open for  enhancing  income  (Moock  at al.,
1989). These  findings,  since  they  use  physical  measures  of productivity  or are
concerned  with the  self-employed,  can  conceptually  be used  to counter  the16
criticism  that  the  returns  to education  are  due  to credentialism  reflected  in
money  wages  in  the labor  market. However,  to the  extent  that  they do not
adequately  control  for  unobserved  characteriLticu  such  as individual  motivation
and  ability,  the findings  could  suffer  from  the same  econometric  biases  that
affect  studies  of  money  wages.
Similarly,  there  is  a burgeoning  literature  on the  effect.  of better
health  and  nutrition  on productivity,  especially  in those  activities  in  which  the
poor are  engaged. While  these  studies  are  not  used  to estimate  rates  of return  as
in education  (the  outcomes  are  often  not  valued  so as to be comparable  to costs),
they show  the impact  on productivity  of physical  measures  of nutrition  and  health.
Several  such  measures  have  been  used  including  anthropometric  measures  (such  as
height,  weight  or body  mass),  mortality  or  morbidity  histories,  loss  of capacity
for  normal  activities  and  nutrient  intake  (in  terms  of calories). For  example,
studies  of agricultural  productivity  indicate  that  an increase  in caloric  intake
results  in  a substantial  increase  in the  efficiency  of an hour  of labor  among
agricultural  workers  in Sri  Lanka,  India  and  Guatemala,  as  well as among  Kenyan
road  crews  (see  Behrman,  1990a  for  citations  and  a  critique). Since  a full  review
of this literature  is  beyond  the scope  of this  paper,  it is informative  simply  to
quote  from  Behrman's  review:
0 ...  though  the  studies  that  attempt  to control  for  simultaneity  are
limited  and  not  without  their  problems,  there  is  growing  evidence  of
positive  effects  of health  and  nutrition  on labor  productivity  of at least
poorer  individuals  in  developing  countries"  (p.  62).
ExternalitLes  and  human  calital. Aside  from  these  direct  effects  on one's
own labor  productivity,  investments  in  human  capital  for  one  individual  can  affect
the  well-being  of others  also.  Some  of these  external  effects  can  accrue  to
society  as a  whole.  For  example,  primary  education  may foster  "good  citizenship"
in a number  of  ways --  increasing  patriotism,  lessening  crime  or,  through
literacy,  easing  the administrative  burdens  of tax collection.  While it is  almost
impossible  to obtain  quantitative  measures  of these  general  impacts,  it ia  also17
difficult  to argue  that they  are  not  important.1 2 There  is avidence  that,  beyond
a certain  level  (fourth  grade),  schooling  leads  to a decline  in fertility
(Cochrane,  1979),  although  a  debate  still  rages  on the effects  of lower  population
growth  on economic  growth  (Birdsall,  Chapter  12).
There  is  more evidence  that investments  that  make  one individual  more
productive  can  have  a positive  effect  on  other  individuals. But  to  what extent
should  such  evidence  be used  to justify  public  intervention  in  the name  of
externalities?  One issu6  hinges  on  the answer  to the  question:  wextornal  to
whom?" Parental  education  will influence  children's  schooling  positively.
Studies  in  Malaysia  and  the  Philippines  found,  for  example,  mothers'  schooling
affects  daughters'  schooling  significantly  (Behrman,  1990a). A similar  argument
can  be  made for  health. But systematic  evidence  outside  the family  situation  has
yet  to be gathered,  so  that  the issue  depends  partly  on whether  benefits  that  are
external  to the individual  but are  internal  to the  household  are important  for
public  policy. This  implies  addressing  some  fundamental  questions  regarding  the
short-sightedness  and  altruism  of a household  with respect  to resource  allocation
among  its  members.
Another  issue  is  whether  all indirect  effects  should  be treated  as
externalities. There  is now  more  evidence  regarding  important  indirect  and  non-
pecuniary  effects  of human  resource  investments.  The  effects  of social  sector
investments  tend to complement  each  other. Schooling  achievement  can  affect
nutrient  intake;  nutrition  depends  on the  type  of food  used,  which,  in  turn,
depends  on the characteristics  of the  preparer. In  Nicaragua,  for  example,  a
study  shows  that  the  more schooling  women  have,  the  better  nourished  are
households  (Behrman  and  Wolfe,  1989).  Several  studies  indicate  that  schooling  has
a strong  positive  effect  on health  indicators.  Mothers'  schooling  is associated
with lower  infant  mortality,  more appropriate  weight-for-age  of children,  greater
use  of medical  facilities  such  as  vaccinatLons  and  better  household  water  quality
(see  Behrman,  1990a  for  a comprehensive  review  of these  studies). But  important
' 2The  magnitude  of these  non-wage  effects  can  be substantial. Although  no
aggregate  numbers  are  available  in  developing  countries,  in  the  United  States,
it  has  been  estimated  that  these  effects  amount  to  up to two  fifths  of the  full
economic  value  of education  (Haveman  and  Wolfe,  1984).18
though they are, there is less evidence to what extent such non-monetary effects
are truly external to the one directly consuming the service.
A final issue concerns methods of analysis.  Just as education can enhance
child nutrition, better nutrition improves the child's capacity to learn.  Recent
studies (for Nepal by Moock and Leslie, 1986 and for China by Jamison, 1986) show,
for example, strong correlations between anthropometric indicators of child health
and various measures of child schooling achievement.  However, theme associations
need not necessarily imply causality, since it is likely that household decisions
about  child health and schooling are determined simultaneously.  A recent paper
(Behrman and Lavy, 1992) examines the nature of the possible biases, which may
work in opposite directions.  If unobserved characteristic. (suct.  as differenceb
in parents' preferences as to their children's attainment at school) lead to
greater schooling achievement as well as better child health, there will be an
upward bias.  But some unobserved characteristics (such as parental concern or
local labor market conditions) may lead parents to direct their resources towards
enhancing intellectual as opposed to physical outcomes, leading to a downward
bias.  Behrman and Lavy's conclusion, using data from Ghana, is that these effects
tend to offset each other so that, for the range of observed health and
achievement measures in their sample, the true effect of health on school success
is negligible.  It will be important in future studies to examine the robustness
of  this result given other initial conditions.
Physical infrastructure.  Physical infrastructure affects the
profitability of private enterprises.  Improving it can lower the cost of
producing a given level of output or, alternatively, can increase the amount of
output produced by all other inputs for a given cost.  The benefits of the typical
"infrastructural' or "public utilities" project in developing countries embody
estimates of these effects (Squire, 1989).  Infrastructure also enables markets to
work better.  Transactions are made less costly and this increases the benefits of
trade, both international and domestic.  For example, major advances in transport
and communications technologies have considerably lowered storage costs by
permitting  producers  to  respond  rapidly  to  changing  consumer  demands  in
international  trade  (Peters,  1992,  and  Kessides,  1993,  refer  to  this  as  "modern
logistics management").19
However,  despite  this  widespread  application,  there  are relatively  few
econometrically-based  studies  of such  effects  at the level  of firms. The  main
reason  for  this is  the  availability  of data. While  there  is now  a reasonably
large  set  of household  and  individual  data  from  surveys  that allow  the direct
measurement  of human  capital  on earnings,  firm-based  information  in developing
countries  is only  beginning  to be  made available  and  utilized  by researchers.
Where  data  do exist,  researchers  have  had  trouble  obtaining  access  to thvm  because
of overzealous  attempts  to protect  confidentiality.  Also,  most firm-based  surveys
do not  contain  adequate  infrastructure  measures  with  which  to relate  to costs  and
output.
The  situation  is  beginning  to change  as several  researchers  are  collecting
their  own  data (Lee  and  Anas,  1992)  or are  managing  to augment  firm-level  data
available  from  official  sources  with infrastructure  variables. The  preliminary
evidence  from  this  type  of analysis  indicates  that  unit costs  tend  to rise  due  to
unreliable  or inaccessible  public  infrastructure.  Firms,  both large  and  small,
spend  a significant  portion  of their  expenditure  on  buying  infrastructure  services
and suffer  when these  are  not  available. In  Nigeria,  for  example,  unreliable
public  utilities  have  led  private  firms  to produce  their  own infrastructure
services  at  high unit  costs  as they  are  unable  to take  advantage  of scale
economies  (Lee  and  Anas,  1992). A recent  study  of small  firms  in  Ghana  named
electricity  outages  as among  the  top four  constraints  to expansion  (Steel  and
Webster,  1991). In agriculture,  infrastructure  provision  has  made a considerable
impact  in  marketing. Transport,  for  example,  can  account  for  about  half  the  costs
of  marketing  agricultural  commodities  --  an activity  that itself  accounts  for  25-
60  percent  of the  final  prices  of goods  (Beenhakker,  1987). This is  reflected  in
improved  prices,  the  diffusion  of technology  and  the  use  of appropriate  inputs,  as
was found  in  a study  in  Bangladesh  (Ahmed  and  Hossain,  1990),  which  compared
villages  that  had  more  developed  infrastructure  services  with  those  that did  not.
Rural  roads  are shown  to reduce  transaction  costs  in India  (Binswanger  et al.,
1989),  Colombia  (cited  in  Kessides,  1993,  p. 27),  where  they  were associated  not
only  with increased  production  but  also  greater  use  of credit  and  in Thailand
(Binswanger,  1983).20
These  studies  are  still  far  from  conclusive  because  they rely  on very
small  sample  sizes  and  do not  control  for  difficult  econometric  issues,  such  as
simultaneity  bias.  For  example,  if improvements  in infrastructure  are
systematically  located  where  firms  are  most likely  to succeed  for  other  reasons,
then  the  estimated  effects  would  be biased  upwards.
The impact  of infrastructure  on poor  households  can  be manifested  in  the
greater  income-earning  opportunities  they  can afford. Improvements  in firm
profitability  are likely  to induce  entry  opportunities  and  enhance  employment
opportunities  in  general,  although  the  net  effect  would  depend  on the
substitutability  between  labor  and  physical  capital  inputs.  Improved
infrastructure  can  make it  easier  for  poor  households  who  own  their  own  businesses
or who are  agricultural  producers  to  make  market  transactions  and  to take
advantage  of profit-making  opportunities.  However,  there  is little  econometric
evidence  that has  been systematically  brought  to bear  on either  of these  issues.
There  is more  micro-level  evidence  that  infrastructure  improves  social
indicators  of  welfare,  particularly  among  the  poor.  The  direct  effect  of physical
infrastructure  on  welfare  is  most obvious  in  the case  of water.  The  poor  can
spend  large  amounts  of resources  on obtaining  water,  either  through  private
vendors  or,  in rural  areas,  by traveling  to  water  sources  (see  Kessides,  1993  for
citations). As will be seen  later,  there  is  often  a  great  deal  of  willingness  to
pay for  improved  services  (Briscoe  et al.,  1993). The  use of clean  water  may  have
as much  to do with social  indicators  such  as infant  mortality  as access  to health
clinics  (see,  for  example,  World  Bank 1993). It is intuitively  appealing  to
suppose  that a  positive  association  exists  between  educational  outcomes  and  the
provision  of infrastructure,  such  as  electricity  in  the  home, (for  example,
students  in  homes  with such  infrastructure  may find  it  easier  to study);  however,
it  has  been  difficult  to obtain  strong  empirical  support  for  this contention
because  infrastructure  tends  to be highly  correlated  with  physical  inputs  to
education  such as  building  quality  and  the  availability  of teaching  materials
(Glewwe  and  Jacoby,  1993).
Conclusions. Micro-economic  studies  of the impact  of infrastructure  on
the  profitability  of firms  and  household  welfare  are  difficult  to undertake  in
developing  countries. One  critical  issue  is  the  availability  of data,21
particularly  for  studies  of physical  infrastructure  and  outcomes  regarding
enterprises. Another  issue  that  affects  all  studies  is  one  that  also afflicts
macro-level  studies --  simultaneity.
Despite  these  drawbacks,  micro-level  studies  are  better  able  to
demonstrate  the link  between  infrastructure  and  productivity  than  those  at the
country-level.  More data  exists,  except  possibly  in the  came  of physical
infrastructure.  There  are  also  more recent  attempts  to account  for  difficult
econometric  questions  by explicitly  modeling  the  source  of the  possible  errors.
Applying  these  techniques  tends  to confirm  the  macro-level  associations  and
predictions  from  theory  about  the links  between  infrastructure,  productivity  and
household  welfare.
3.  Public  Invest_ent:  the  Role  and  Challenees
In  most countries  (both  developing  and  developed),  governments  provide  and
finance  most human  and  physical  infrastructure.  Over 90  percent  of primary  school
children  and  three  quarters  of secondary  school  children  attend  public  schools,
all  of which  are  heavily  subsidized  and  most  of which  are  free. Almost  half  of
all  health  spending  is attributable  to the  public  sector. It is  thus not
surprising  that central  government  spending  in all  of these  sectors  accounts  for
an average  of about  5 percent  of GDP  in  developing  countries  (Worlc  Bank,  1992a).
The comparable  figures  for  physical  infrastructure  are  more difficult  to
summarize  since  the  institutional  arrangements  under  which  providers  operate  may
not  be so clearly  delineated  as a spending  item  of the  central  government. Many
services  are  provided  by state-owned  enterprises  ,  such  as public  utilities.
However,  these  enterprises  are  heavily  subsidized,  and  the  evidence  that  exists22
shows  that  the bulk  of infrastructure  in  most  countries  is financed  by governments
(see,  for  example,  World  Bank,  1988c,  Chapter  8).1
Public  spending  does  not  give  a full  pieture  of the  extent  of government
involverent. Even  those  infrastructure  services  that  are  provided  by the  private
sector  are  subject  to varyLng  degrees  of regulatory  control,  including  constraints
on the rate  of return  (partLcularly  for  natural  monopolLes)  and  on the  type  of
service  being  delivered  (such  as currlcula  ln schools  --  see,  for  example,  James,
1991).
This  section  revlews  the  prLncLples  gulding  such  involvement,  thp
challenges  to those  principles  given  the experlence  of applying  them  and  recent
suggestlons  that have  been  made  to improve  the situation.
The  Princivles
Economic  theory  justifies  an important  role  for  government  intervention  in
efficient  and  equitable  infrastructure  use and  provision. The  arguments  rest  on
several  "traditional"  notions  of market  failure,  such  as:  externalities  in
consumption  and  production;  scale  economiesl  failures  in related  markets,  like
credit  (education  and  physical  infrastructure),  insurance  (health)  and  labor
markets  (all  sectors);  non-excludability;  information  problems  about  benefits  and
costs;  and  the  need  to achieve  objectives  such  as equity  or poverty  alleviation.
These  standard  arguments  are  well  known  ln  the  traditlonal  publlc  fLnance
llterature  and  need not  be dsocussed  in  detail  here.  1  But applying  them is
difficult  because  infrastructure  services  are  diverse  and  each exhibits  these
characteristics  to varying  degrees.
As discussed  in  the  previous  section,  emplrical  research  quantifying  the
importance  of these  externalities  ia far  from  deflnitive. Thus,  the  general
'3Aeide  from  direct  budeetary  burdens  from  non-performing  publLc  enterprises,
there are also indirect  contributions  in the form of unpaid  taxes and debt
service  guaranteed  by the  government. For  example,  the state  power  company  of
The  Gambia  owed  its  treasury  the  equivalent  of 16 percent  of current  government
revenue  in 1984;  its  own  unpaid  claims  on  the  government  amounted  to  one  quarter
of these  arrears  (World  Bank,  1988c).
"For a thorough  review  of basiec  prLneiples,  see  Atklnson  and Stiglitz
(1980). There  are  also  many  treatments  of  market  failures  wlthln  sectors,  such
as the claseic  article  by  Arrow (1963)  for  the  health  field.23
principles can only be a rough guide to the appropriateness of government
intervention.
Externalities.  When one individual's consumption affects the well-being
of others, the individual should be induced by public action to consider the
social rather than just the private costs and benefit of his or her behavior.  In
the case of human infrastructure, most of these effects are assumed to be
positive, thus requiring intervention by government.  These might include general
effects on society "at large", such as in eradicating certain types of diseases
through mass immunization programs.  While there is little solid empirical work on
this issue, more evidence is beginning to be marshalled on externalities that
affect smaller groups of identifiable individuals.  These include the positive
impact of schooling and parents' health investments on children's access to these
services (which  may constitute an externality if parents are myopic or are not
altruistic towards their children --  which are important and controversial
assumptions, as was already discussed in the previous section).
With physical infrastructure services, negative externalities have been
used more in justifying government investment.  Congestion and pollution are the
most important reasons cited in the literature as to why private markets may not
lead to optimal results.  In the case of roads, another externality is that
associated with damage to users caused by other users (vehicles cause potholes
which cause damage to other vehicles --  see Small, et al., 1989).
Scale economies.  Some infrastructure investments, especially in physical
infrastructure, entail large fixed costs, and thiL argument is often used to
justify natural monopolies which can deliver the service at lower than average
costs due to scale effects.  Another aspect is the need to integrate service
delivery into networks that cover a wide geographic area.  An example would be the
distribution of hydroelectricity; dams require a large long-term investment and
the electricity they generate needs to be distributed over a large area via
efficient trunk-feeder lines in order to lower unit costs (Munasinghe and Warford,
1982).
Non-excludability and monitorino use.  This is particularly important for
physical infrastructure and some health-related programs (such  as vector-control
activities through spraying).  Roads and other transport modes have traditionally24
been  thought  to be too non-exclusionary  for  a private  market  to work  well,
although  the setting  up of private  toll  roads  in  a number  of location.  ha.  led
some  to reconsider  this  proposition  (Hau  1990). In the  water  sector,  many argue
that it is impossible  to  monitor  all  thoue  who benefit  from  a very large
irrigation  scheme  (see,  for  example,  Repetto,  1986)  although  beneficiaries  of
residential  water  supply  can  be reached  more  easily.
Information  about  benefits. While  information  needs  to be disseminated
regarding  all  infrastructure  services,  it is  widely  accepted  to be most  essential
in  the  case  of health. Much of the  focus  on  why hea)th  costs  are  so high has  to
do with  the simple  fact  that  an asymmetry  of knowledge  exists  between  consumers
and  doctors;  in  other  words,  consumers  cannot  be  expected  to be able  to gather
enough  information  to make informed  decisions  about  the kind  of health  care  they
need (even  this is controversial  the  patient  also  has  the  most information  about
he or she  truly  feels). Thus,  even  in the  United  States,  where  consumers  are
perhaps  some  of the  best informed  in the  world,  lack  of information  is considered
to be the  most important  reason  why a primarily  private  system  fails  to provide
health  care cost-effectively.' 5
Meetina  eauitv  and  non-economic  obiectlves. Particularly  in  the case  of
human  infrastructure,  governments  may have  objectives  other  than  narrowly-defined
effectiveness  and  cost-efficiency  criteria. One is  poverty  reductlon. Indeed,
the  provision  of infrastructure  has  been center  stage  ln  many of the  recent  policy
pronouncements  from  lnternational  agencies  as  a way for  the  poor to enhance  their
capacity  to take advantage  of income-earning  opportunities.16  Other  possible
objectives  include  investments  to promote  national  seocurity  or solidarity.
The  Record  Recardina  Teehnical  Efficiency
Lately,  however,  concern  about  the  effectiveness,  cost  and  equity  of
public  intervention  has  sparked  an  often  spirited  debate  about  the  need  to  temper
these  market  failure  arguments  with  analyses  of  posesible  government  failure.  The
'Isor  work  on  developing  countries  on  the  nature  of  externalities,  see  World
Bank,  1993.
"6World  Bank,  1990;  UNDP,  1991.25
rest  of this section  discusses  these  concerns. For  convenience,  it first  deals
with  more narrowly-defined  efficiency  issues  --  in  other  words,  resource
allocation  under  the  assumption  of distribution  neutrality. It  then goes  on to
assess  the  evidence  regarding  equity.
Investing  in  the  riaht  tvoe  of service. An issue  that has  received  much
attention  in the  policy  debate  is  that  the  most  productive  types  of infrastructure
services  are  under-provided.  Many  recent  policy  studies  have  argued  that
investment  has  not  been sufficiently  directed  towards  those  infrastructure
services  that  have  the  highest  social  rates  of return. This is a reflection  of
both an under-emphasis  on relatively  inexpensive  investments  and  a lack  of
government  attention  to  those  services  that  exhibit  the  most  important  public  good
characteristics.
The  evidence  supporting  this  point  has  been  more indicative  and  anecdotal,
rather  than analytically  rigorous. For  example,  Table  4 shows  that,  for  24
developing  countries,  when  governments  faced  tough  expenditure  choices  due  to
macroeconomic  crises,  economic  infrastructure  spending  bore a larger  burden  of
fiscal  adjustments. These  are  sectors  that  have  a high  ratio  of capital  to
recurrent  spending. When countries  have  had  to  make difficult  spending  decisions,
they  have  tended  to start  by cutting  longer-term  capital  investment.  While  some
of these  declines  in  expenditure  on physical  infrastructure  may  be long  overdue
because  of overcapacity  or may simply  reflect  constraints  in  the capital  market,  a
persistent  trend  in  this  direction  may  begin  to compromise  long-term  growth.
In  human  resources,  Table  4 indicates  that,  during  times  of adjustment,
governments  do  try  to  preserve  spending  on  social  services  and  welfare,  at  least
in  relative  terms.  But  many  argue  that  such  a  trend  is  hardly  an  advance  --  more
resources  are  needed  as  demands  are  increasing.  And  most  important,  investment  in
human  resources,  particularly  in  basic  education  and  health,  continues  to be a
high-return  but  relatively  neglected  spending  category. The  World  Bank's  review
of adjustment  lending  is  typical  of such  criticism,  citing,  in  the case  of Brazil:
"...resource  concentration  at tertiary  levels  and  of declining  allocations
for  basic  social  services,  despite  poor  social  indicators...(The  neglect
is  reflected  in a lack  of)  critical  complementary  inputs,  such  as  basic
drugs,  textbooks,  and  supplies,  at the  expense  of continued
overstaffing...Similar  problems  can  be found  in many  other...countries"
(World  Bank,  1992c).26
Tlbk  4:  ExpenOture  Trends by Sector for  24 Countries that Expedenced  Real
Decines  in Total Expenditure  (1979-1989)
Percentage change  Elastichy"
Total  expenditure  -17.2  1.00
General  public  -9.2  0.53
Defence  -6.25  0.38
Social  sectors  -11.4  0.66
Productive  -18.7  1.08
Infrastructure  -25.4  1.47
Othersh'  -1.4  0.08
al:  % change  in the ith  sectoral  over  the % change  in total expenditures.
b/:  Includes  interest,  transfers  to local  governments  and other  non-sector  specific
expenditures
Source: Hicks  (1991)
These anecdotal examples, while dramatic, do not use careful studies
comparing the economic costs of misallocations across sectors.  As will be
discussed below, the methodology for making such comparisons has yet to become
a practical reality --  particularly when one is dealing with investments for
which benefit calculations are difficult to obtain due to externalities and
public good characteristics.
Effectiveness of Dublic sDendino.  A growing literature points out
that publicly-provided infrastructure services can be made much more effective
in terms of measurable outcomes.  The concern is not so much with an inability
to produce quantity, as it is with poor quality.  The descriptive evidence
refers to low achievement scores and high repetition rates in education
(Lockheed et al., 1991) and in the lack of drugs in clinics (World Bank,27
1987a).  In the power sector, it is a lack of system reliability (World Bank,
1992).  A recent review indicates that in 85 developing countries, a quarter
of the paved roads outside urban areas need reconstruction --  as do a third of
the unpaved roads (World  Bank, 1988b).
The economic costs of such ineffectiveness can be enormous.  The
repair bill for the roads in developing countries that need to be
reconstructed would amount to $40-45 billion --  considerably more than the $12
billion it might have taken in timely preventive measures to keep these roads
operational (World Bank, 1988b).  In Nigeria, because of persistent breakdowns
in publicly-provided infrastructure, 92 percent of surveyed firms owned their
own electricity generators (Lee and Anas, 1992).  These costs were excessively
high because the firms had to invest relatively large fixed costs for small
volumes of output (they  were also prevented from selling their excess output).
Thus, when governments fail to provide reliable services, enterprises can
improvise by trying to compensate, but at a larger cost to society.
More rigorous evidence to support the anecdotal evidence on the
effectiveness of government intervention is only beginning to be found.  One
such strand of research indicates that, while the empirical link between
infrastructure-related outcome measures (for example, percentage enrollment
rates or the availability of road networks) and economic growth is strong, the
quantitative evidence on the link between public spending on these
infrastructure categories and growth is weak (see, for example, Devarajan et
al., 1992).  This result could partly be attributed to the difficulty in
getting good cross-country data on government spending, or to differences
across countries in the cost of infrastructure.  More research is warranted to
test the robustness of this aggregate result.
Hiah unit costs.  Another issue that is symptomatic of inefficiency is
that the unit costs of providing the services are too high for a given level
of output quantity or quality.  one indicator of this comes from comparisons
of costs for public and r -. vate  providers.  These comparisons must be
carefully done in order to ensure that unit costs are computed at the same
levels of quantity (in other words, net of scale effects) and quality.28
In human resources, several studies on education estimate the
determinants of student achievement and use these calculations to conclude
that, with secondary level student characteristics held constant, a
randomly-chosen student would perform better in a private school compared to a
public school in five developing countries (Jimenez  et al., 1992).'7 For the
average student, the gains in academic achievement to attending private school
rather than public school are shown in column 1 of Table 5.  At the same time,
unit costs for the private schools are on average lower than those in public
schools, due primarily to lower wage bills --  teachers are as effective in
private schools, although they are paid less and have lower official teaching
qualifications (column 2 of Table 5).
Studies of the relative effectiveness of publicly and privately-
provided physical infrastructure tend not to control as carefully for quality
and scale effects, making it more difficult to evaluate the unit cost
comparisons.  Still, the descriptive studies are indicative of the magnitude
of the possible discrepancy.  In transport, for example, studies indicate that
bus transport for intra-city travel is much less costly when in the hands of
the private sector (World Bank, 1988c).  Private bus companies also tend to
have a higher fleet utilization rate, a lower staffing ratio and a lower
incidence of fare evasion than their subsidized public counterparts (Armstrong
and Thierez, 1987).  In the power sector, losses during transmission and
distribution (partly through theft) are notoriously high; as a percentage of
generation, the losses are 31 percent in Bangladesh, 28 percent in Pakistan
and 22 percent in Thailand and the Philippines compared to only 8 percent in
the U.S. and 7 percent in Japan (World Bank, 1992a, p. 137).  These lead to
very high costs.
"7Since  it is likely  that high-performing students  come from  affluent homes,
which  provide  a  more  conducive  atmosphere  for  education  and  self-select
themselves into private school, these studies also control for possible sample
selection  bias via  Heckman's two-step  technique.  The identifying  restriction for
the equations varies.  In the Philippines case study, for example, the relative
distance of alternative public and  private schools from the household is  used to
explain the choice of school type but is not used in  the achievement equations.29
Tablk S:  Relative Average Cost and Effciency  of PubUc  and Private Schools
(1)  (2)  (3)
Ratio of  Ratio of private cost  Ratio of relative cost
Counwty  relative  effectiveness  to public cost  to effectivenessl
Colombia  1.13  0.69  0.61
Dominican  Republic
Non-elite  private  1.31  0.65  0.50
Elite private  1.47  1.46  0.99
Philippines b/
Math  1.00  0.83  0.83
English  1.18  0.83  0.70
Pilipino  1.02  0.83  0.82
Tanzania  1.16  0.69  0.59
Thailand  2.63  0.39  0.15
Il  Col(2)/Col(l)
b/  Public cost estimates  and weighted  average of national  and local costs.  Costs are assumed  to be the sam
for aU three subjects  and are based on World Bank estimates.
Source: Jimenez  et al.,  1991.
The Record  Regarding  Eauitv
Poverty  reduction is often cited as another major justification for
government  intervention.  Equal  access  to  some  infrastructure  services  are
particularly crucial as they either alleviate some of the main consequences of
being poor (for example, access to health services or clean water has a direct
bearing on individual well-being) or they enhance the opportunities for the
poor to escape their plight (for  example, education enhances future labor
productivity).30
The record  for  access  to publicly-provided  infrastructure  servlces  is,
at best,  a  mixed  one.'@  In  order  to review  the  available  evidence  adequately,
it is first  useful  to review  some  of the  data  and  methodologies  that analysts
have  used.
Data need.  The  data  requirements  for Lncidence  analysis  can  be
heavy. The  basic  need  is for  a representative  sample  survey  that includes
information  not  only  on the  level  of well-being  of the  relevant  population  but
also  on their  use  of the infrastructure  service  under  discussion. This  means
that consumption  or household  budget  surveys  that included  no data  on the use
of public  facilities  would  be insufficient.  If the  analysis  were  to take into
account  behavioral  concerns  as well,  then  the  data  requirements  would  increase
accordingly.
Can anything  be done  without  specialized  household  surveys? One  way
would  be to conduct  incidence  analysis  by sector  of economic  activity  or  by
geographic  region,  if  it  can  reasonably  be  ascertained  that  certain  income
groups  are  concentrated  in  such  sectors  or  regions.
Methods  of estimatina  benefit  incidence. Human  and  physical
infrastructure  spending  typically  accounts  for  about  5-10  percent  of all
public  spending. The general  question  addressed  in studies  of benefit
incidence  analysis  of such  expenditures  in developing  countries  is:  who
benefits  from  various  components  of public  spending? In  particular,  how  does
the  receipt  of the  benefits  of public  spending  vary  across  groups  with
different  levels  of well-being?"
The  most  popular  method  --  and  one  employed  in  the seminal  analyses  by
Meerman  (1979)  and  Selowsky  (1979)  --  consists  of the following  steps. First,
everyone  is ranked  by level  of  well-being  --  usually  a  measure  of income  or
consumption.  Second,  the  average  use  of  the  relevant  infrastructure  service
"3This  chapter  focuses  only  on  infrastructure  services,  most  of  which  are
targeted  broadly  --  that  is,  have  no  explicit  mechanism  for  distinguishing  among
recipients.  The  Lipton  and  Ravallion  chapter  will  deal  explicitly  with  subsidies
that  are  narrowly  targeted  with  explicit  selection  mechanismsl  I  will  only  make
brief  cross-references  here.
"9There  have  been  several  reviews:  de  Wulf  (1975),  Jimenez  (1986)  and  Selden
and  Wasylenko  (1991).31
for  each  income  or consumption  group  is then  estimated. Third,  the cost  to
the  government  of providing  that service  is used  am a proxy  for  the  benefit  of
consuming  that service. Fourth,  the  level  of  well-being  is  compared  before
and  after  the intervention  by adding  the assumed  benefit  level  to the  pre-
interventlon  welfare  measure.
There  are several  key  assumptions  in  using  this  methodology. One set
of assumptions  has  to do  with how  to  measure  the level  of  well-being. This
issue  is  well-covered  in Lipton  and  Ravallion'e  chapter  of this  volume.
Income  is  probably  the  most popular  measure,  despite  its  obvious  drawbacks  for
developing  countries  --  some  forms  of income  are  hard  to value,  particularly
those  of the self-employed  and farmers  (who  are  important  in less  developed
countries)  and, on  top of this,  income  tends  to vary,  and  not just  seasonally.
Consumption  is  probably  easier  to measure  (although  it is  similarly  difficult
to make  an accurate  assessment  of spending  on items  such  as housing).
overall,  consumption  does not  vary  as much  as income  and,  as such,  it is
consistent  with  the utility  maximizing  model,  since  consumption  is simply  the
amount  of money  required  to reach  a certain  level  of welfare. A related
consideration  is  which  unit  of observation  to choose,  whether  household  or
individual  (again,  see  Lipton  and  Ravallion). If intra-household  distribution
is important,  then the individual  is  a more  appropriate  basis  of analysis.
The  most complicated  set  of assumptions  revolves  around  the argument
that  the  public  cost  of the service  is  an appropriate  proxy  for  the  benefits
accruing  to the individual  who  gets initial  access  to the subsidy. This  may
not  be so for  a number  of reasons. First,  if  the  beneficiary  can  resell  the
access  to the  subsidy,  then  the  benefits  will  be shared,  depending  on the
resale  price. tm This is  unlikely  to be an issue  in  the  case  of the services
with  which  we are  dealing  since  it is  rather  difficult  to resell  access  to
infrastructure  services.
Second,  the  benefit  to an individual  of an in-kind  subsidy  may  not  be
equivalent  to the  cash  value  of purchasing  that service. The equivalence
'The analysis  will  be similar  to that in  tax incidence  work (see  Atkinson
and  Stiglitz,  1980).32
holds  if  the in-kind  subsidy  can  be resold  in the  open  marketi  it  would  still
hold  even if resale  were  not  possible,  provided  that  the  consumption  of that
service  after  the subsidy  is infra-marginal.  However,  if  consumption  is not
infra-marginal,  then  the value  to the  individual  of the in-kind  subsidy  may
well  be less  than  that of its  cash  value  to the  government. For  example,  a
review  of "social  housing  programs"  in the  U.S. and  Germany  demonstrates  that
the  value  to beneficiaries  ranged  from  58-62  percent  of the  cost  of provision
(Mayo,  1986).
Third,  the  benefit  of an in-kind  infrastructure  subsidy  may  be more or
less  than  the  cost  of government  provision  if it precipitates  behavioral
adjustments  by households  that  would  affect  the  welfare  of the  recipients.
For  example,  public  transfers  may substitute,  at least  in part,  for  the
provision  of private  transfers. A series  of research  studies  for  developing
countries  shows  that  private  transfers  are  targeted  towards  recipients  of
public  subsidies  in  education  and  health  (Cox  and  Jimenez,  1990). In fact,  a
case study  for  Peru indicates  that  private  transfers  would  have  been about  one
fifth  more had  there Aot  been a  publicly-funded  social  security  system  for
old-age  support  (Cox  and  Jimenez,  1991).
Finally,  there  may  be a  difference  between  marginal  and  average
benefits. Most  incidence  analysis  is  concerned  with  measuring  average
benefits. However,  what is important  for  policy  prescriptions  are  marginal
benefits  --  the  benefits  of another  unit  of access. This  may  be very
different  for  certain  income  groups. For  example,  studies  indicate  that  the
marginal  gain for  an additional  unit  of access  to health  services,  as  measured
by willingness-to-pay,  may decrease  for  lower  income  groups  (Gertler  et al.
19891  Gertler  and  van  der  Gaag,  1991).
Results. These  considerations  are  rarely  addressed  for  the  majority
of incidence  studies  that have  been implemented  for  developing  countries.
Nevertheless,  with  appropriate  caveats,  these  studies  using  standard
assumptions  have  been found  to be useful  (see  reasons  outlined  in Selden  and
Wasylenko,  1991).
Given  tb'at  the standard  methodology  is  benefit  incidence  analysis,
three  important  factors  will  generally  determine  which  services  benefit  poorer31
income groups the most.  One factor is the relative costs of different typos
services.  For example, in education, the unit costs is higher education are
very much higher than those of other levels.  In all developing countries, the
opportunity cost of one higher education student is 26 primary school
students; in Africa, the ratio is 53:1.  In health, present subsidies are  also
unevenly distributed, partly because urban-based hospital care is much more
expensive than other types of intervention (World Bank, 1988c).
A second factor is whether access to these various services is
distributed evenly across the population.  In most cases, they are not.. In
education, for example, because only a few people benefit from the large
subsidies in higher education, 71 percent of the population gets only
22 percent of the subsidies (World Bank, 1988c).
A  third factor is the characteristics of those who do get access.
Despite zero prices, there is often a high private cost to access.  Materials
(drugs),  opportunity cost and transport can be a large proportion of private
cost even though fees are minimal.  When there is supply-side quantity
rationing, it often favors the rich.  One important reason for this is
location --  richer urban households often have better access than poorer rural
households to both physical and human infrastructure.  Also, there are ways to
buy into access.  For example, in education, examples abound of private
tutoring in order for households to get access to free, high-quality public
schools whose quantity is controlled.  In health, coverage in those systems
covered by formal social security is often better --  but this means that it is
open yrimarily to better-off workers in the formal sector.
Given these considerations, it is thus not surprising that, while the
distribution of the benefits of overall public social spending (human  and some
physical infrastructure) tends to be pro-poor (see, for example, Table 6a and
Selden and Wasylenko, 1991), there is considerable variation depending on the
type of service one considers.  Tables 6b and 6c indicate that basic services,
such as primary education and most public health interventions (particularly
if they are concentrated in rural areas) tend to be strongly pro-poor.
However, the poor are systematically under-represented in terms of their34
access  to those  services  that  tend  to be the  most subsidized  per  unit  of
service,  such  as higher  education  and  urban-based  hospital  care.
T1ae 6z  The  Impact  of Government  Subsidies
(Educaion,  Health,  Social  Secut,  Housing,  Water)
(1980)
Income  share  Income  share
without  subsidy  with  subsidy
Argentina
- Lowest 20%  7.1  10.0
- Highest 20%  43.7  39.6
Costa Rica
- Lowest 20%  5.9  8.8
- Highest  20%  47.8  42.7
Chile
- Lowest  20%  2.5  6.6
- Highest 20%  66.2  54.4
Dominican  Republic
- Lowest 20%  5.1  6.4
- Highest 20%  53.3  50.7
Uruguay
- Lowest 20%  6.4  9.0
- Highest 20%  50.4  43.8
Source: Petrei, 1987.35
raft  : Dmgj hd*me  qi Vwim  Izp_  iv  Cuigeuw
M  m  hA_  C Ub
All education  +  +  +  - +
Basic education  +  +  +  - +
Secondary  education  +  +  +  -
High education
Health  +  +  +  +  +
Social security  . .
Housing  +  - +
Water
Source: Petrei, 1987.
Note:  +  =  Contbute  to Eqwah,
- =  Contdbute  to Inequaly36
Table (c.  Wio Gets  Soal  S&ctor  Subsidies?
Percentage  oJgovernment  suwy
recedved  by income  group
Year  of  Lower  Middk  Upper
Couwiy  and sector  surey  49percent  49percent  23perceat
A  educton
Argentina  1983  48  35  17
Chile  1983  48  34  17
Colombia  1974  40  39  21
Costa Rica  1983  42  38  20
Domnincan  Republic  1976-77  24  43  14
Uruguay  1983  52  34  14
Indonesia  1978  46  25'  29'
Malaysia  1974  41  41  18
Higher education
Argentina  1983  17  45  38
Chile  1983  12  34  54
Colombia  1974  6  35  60
Costa  Rica  1983  17  41  42
Dominican  Republic  1976-77  2  22  76
Uruguay  1980  14  52  34
Indonesia  1978  7  10'  83'
Malaysia  1974  10  38  52
Public  healh
Argentina  1980  69  27  4
Colombia  1974  42  40  20
Costa Rica  1983  49  38  13
Chile  1983  51  47  11
Dominican  Republic  1984  57  44  9
Uruguay  1983  64  25  12
Indonesia  1978  19  36'  45 b
Iran  1977  51  37  13
Malaysia  1974  47  37  17
Philippines  1975  27  33  40
Sri Lanka  1978  46  39  14
Hospftaks
Colombia  1974  23  53  23
Malaysia  1974  36  34  20
II/  hese figures  are for the middle 30 percent.
_/  These figures  are for the upper 30 percent.
Sources:  Jimenez (1987), Petrei (1977), World Bank (1986).37
There  are fewer  studies  that  measure  benefit  lncidence  for  public
enterprises  dispensing  physical  infrastructure  (Selden  and  Wasylenko,  1991).
Studies  in  Malaysia  and  Colombia  have  found  that  the  distribution  of subsidies
for  electricity,  residential  piped  water  and  sewerage  services  are  generally
not  pro-poor  (Meerman,  19791  Selowaky,  1979). These  studies  emphasis  the fact
that  these  services  tend  to be located  in urban  areas,  where  average  income  is
higher  than in rural  areas. Moreover,  within  urban  areas,  there  is some  clear
case  study  evidence  that higher  income  families  have  better  access  than  poorer
ones in  terms  of individual  physical  connections  to main lines  (Briscoe  et
al.,  1993). Poorer  families  must  thus  rely  on private  water  vendors  for  their
water  supply  and  must pay  higher  unit  prices  than  richer  households,  as shown
in Table  7.21
21Private  water  vendors  are those  who sell  water  in the street,  mainly  in
low-income  communities.  This  term  does  not  apply  to  those  who  sell  bottled  water
in specialty  stores.38
Table  7: Ratio  of the Price  Chaed by Pvate Water  Vendors  to the  Pc  ChO ed
by  th  Public  Utly  in Selected  Ctes,
mid-1970s  to early  1980s
Ciy, country  Prc  ratio
Kampala, Uganda  4:1 to 9:1
Lagos, Nigeria  4:1 to 10:1
Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire  5:1
Lome, Togo  7:1 to 10:1
Nairobi, Kenya  7:1 to 11:1
Istanbul,  Turkey  10:1
Dhaka, Bangladesh  12:1 to 2S:1
Tegucigalpa,  Honduras  16:1 to 34:1
Lima, Peru  17:1
Port-au-Prince,  Haiti  17:1 to 100:1
Surabaya, Indonesia  20:1 to 60:1
Karachi, Pakistan  28:1 to 83:1
Source: World Bank, 1988c.
Towards  losrovina  Public  Investasnt  Policies
The  preceding  analysis  has identified  the  followlng  needs 
--  across  sectors,  to set  priorities  more approprLately  by focusing
on  subsidized  public  investments  Ln  those  activities  that  have  the
highest  marginal  returns  to  public  funds  and  that  are  used
primarily  by  the poor;
--  within  sectors,  to  distinguish  among  subsectors  and  apply  the  same
criteria  as  those  governing  the cholce  among  sectorsl
--  to mobilize  more resources  in  a non-distortionary  way;
--  to improve  management  and internal  efficLency;  and
--  to improve  targeting  to the  poor.39
If followed,  these  actions  will lead  to socially  efficLent  policles,  as
they  are  roughly  equivalent  to taking  into  account  appropriate  shadow  prlce-.
But  meaningful  and sustainable  policy  reform  must investigate  more deeply  into
the  root  causes  of policy  failure  --  what led  to the  present  unsatisfactory
outcomes  and  what  reforms  can  be instituted  to correct  for  them?
An extensive  inquiry  is  beyond  the scope  of this  paper,  but  it is  useful
to focus  on several  general  reasons  that  have  preoccupied  analysts  trying  to
improve  investment  policy  in infrastructure.  There  appears  to be a general
consensus  that investing  more  money  in  much  the same  way  as before  will not
solve  the  problems  and  that,  therefore,  appropriate  policy  reform  is the  key.
If  so,  one  must  understand  the  policymakers  --  their  abilities,  the
information  and  techniques  available  to them  and  their  incentives. The  rest
of this  section  reviews  some  recent  work  addressing  some  of these  parameters,
including  developing  better  tools  of analysis,  fostering  institutional  reform
that  increases  efficiency,  such  as decentralization  and  greater  private  sector
involvement,  and  taking  political  economy  into  account  in  analyzing
infrastructure  investment.
Better  tools  of analysis. one important  area is  to develop  more
practical  tools  of analysis  or guidelines  for  allocating  resources  across
spending  categories  --  that is,  choosing  among  spending  alternatives  by
weighing  benefits  and  costs  through  an analysis  of their  social  rates  of
return. This  is often  a problem  because  the  tools  for  doing  so for  both human
and  physical  infrastructure  are  far  from  perfect.
Formal  cost-benefit  exercises  are  often  not  used  to evaluate  investments
in  human  infrastructure.  One  reason  may  be that  it is often  difficult  to
evaluate  benefits  for  many  human  resource  investments. In  education,  although
there  are  a growing  number  of studies  that  estimate  the  rate  of return  to
different  levels  of education  (see  Table  1),  they  are  not  available  for  many
countries,  are  of variable  quality  and  generally  ignore  some  high  cost-
2For  example,  the World Bank's  operational  guidelines  for the economic
analysis of projects acknowledge  that, "while it may be possible to use
quantitative  criteria  in  such  [social)  sectors  more  often  than  is  customary,  both
conceptual  and statistical  difficulties  limit  their  application". (The  World
Bank,  1980,  OMS  2.21 "Economic  Analysis  of Projects".)40
*ervices, such as alternative disciplines in higher education.  Moreover, as
discussed earlier, most of the benefit estimates (which are typically inferred
from wage differentials) are unable to take into account such difficulties as
externalities or quality effects.  On the health side, rates of return are
only very rarely computed because evaluating benefits requires explicit
calculations of the value of life (or healthy life-years).  The methodological
difficulty of doing this have forced analysts to conduct instead cost-
effective analyses that allow only limited inter-sectoral comparisons of
spending options.
Because of these factors, combined with the misleading but lingering
view that "social" services cannot inherently be compared with "productive"
services, rate-of-return comparisons are not used to guide investmen.
decisions in the social sectors.  This view has recently been challenged by
those who claim that rates of return can indeed be computed for education and
health services (Psacharopoulos, 1985) and that, in any case, the pitfall. in
deriving benefit estimates for these services are no worse than those that
plague physical infrastructure.
Another possible reason why cost-benefit methodology is not so widely
used as a planning tool is that the most important spending decisions in human
resources are not about discrete capital investments but about more continuous
flows of recurrent spending.  In theory, the techniques can be adapted to
evaluate recurrent spending, a larger component in social expenditures than in
infrastructure expenditures, which are heavily weighted by new investments
(see Besley 1989b for suggestions on how to make such concerns operational).
In practice, implementation is more difficult because data on recurrent
spending categories are often not neatly subdivided in a way that is relevant
for policy --  for example, the joint costs of producing various levels of
education and health expenditures are difficult to sort out.  Thus, the need
to develop practical economically-oriented guidance on inter-sectoral spending
choices remains a priority item on the conceptual agenda.  Even in the absence
of hard data, however, the discipline of going through steps of benefit-cost
calculation in making broad sectoral allocations can help to make the logic of
spending decisions more transparent and explicit.41
In the case of physical infrastructure, rate of return analysis has a
well-established methodology and a long accepted tradition in development (see
Dreze and Stern, 1991 and Squire, 1989 for recent comprehensive treatments of
the concepts).  But a recent review by Little and Mirrlees (1990) indicates
that the analytical principles are not being applied systematicallys
"We have claimed that much in the rules (about cost-benefit analysis] we
collected and prescribed in 1969 and 1974 has survived analytical
scrutiny, that these procedures are capable of being used effectively,
and that many important aspects of them have been neglected by project
evaluators.  We have found that the extent to which they are used and
have real influence is not great... (p. 376).
The authors then suggest that this is one reason why investment in developing
countries has had very low returns in the aggregate, leading to low growth
during the 1980s.0
The question is, how can this prccess be improved?  At issue is the
complexity of the methods, as well as the incentives of the institutions to
take them seriously.  Squire (1991) suggests the following practical
principles: (i)  basing project costs on historical experience (rather than on
overly optimistic projections), (ii)  using shadow pricing, but only when it is
critical (that is, for those projects whose profitability is highly sensitive
to the choice of the standard conversion factor) and (iii)  explicitly building
in analyses for cost recovery to those projects that result in a net cost to
the public sector but a net benefit overall.
Another methodological issue is that conventionally-estimated rates of
return may be an inadequate guide to investment choice in the absence of an
analysis of the general economic environment in which the project is
operating.  Table 8 depicts how rates of return to public projects --
particularly those in infrastructure --  vary with various indices of market
distortions resulting from trade restrictions, exchange rate interventions,
the real rate of interest and the public deficit.  Fewer distortions are
NHowever, they do note that World Bank projects tended to have relatively
high rates of  return.  But the rest of the  investment portfolio  for these
countries  did  not  fare  as  well  --  which  raises  the  important  issue  of
fungibility.42
highly  correlated  with greater  rates  of return. 2'  While  these  calculations
are  based  only on  World  Bank  projects,  they  are  from  an extensive  database  of
1,200  projects  over  a 20-year  period  (Kaufmann,  1991). A similar  study  on  the
success  of human  resource  projects  (measured  by ex-post  evaluation  rankings
rather  than  by rates  of return,  which  are  not  calculated)  finds  similar
results  (Kaufmann  and  Wang,  1992).
Tabl  8:  Economic Policies and Average  Economfc Rates of Return for Pojects
Ffnanced  by the World  Bank and the IFC, 1968-89  (1%)
Publc projects
AU  public  In non-radk
Policy distorflon  Index  projects  sectors
7ade restrictiveness
High  13.6  14.6
Moderate  15.4  16.0
Low  19.3  24.3
Foreign exchange  premium
High (200 or more)  7.2  11.5
Moderate  (20-200)  14.9  17.2
Low (ess than 20)  18.0  19.3
Real interest  rate
Negative  15.4  17.9
Positive  17.5  17.9
Fiscal defcitg
High (8 or more)  13.7  16.6
Moderate (4-8)  15.1  16.8
Low Oess than 4)  18.1  18.2
L Percentage  of GDP.
Source: Kaufinann  1991.
24It  is  not  possible  to  infer  causality  strictly  because  of  a  possible  source
of  bias  in  the  comparisons  if  the  observed  policy  distortions  are  caused  by  the
same  factors  (say,  political  economy)  that  affect  the  rates  of return.43
The  problem  of inter-oectoral  resource  allocation  can  be approached
using  the  modern  theory  of optimal  taxation  (Besley,  1989a  ls  an example  of
this).  The problem  would  be to derive  a set  of optimal  subsidies,  which  can
be interpreted  simply  as negative  taxes. Given  costs,  these  would  imply  a set
of optimal  prices  for  all  public  serviceu. These  would  presumably  depend  upon
the relative  elasticities  of demand  for  the  range  of goods  and  services. If,
for  example,  demand  for  transport  services  were  more inelastlc  than  that for
some  health  service,  then  cross-subsidies  from  transport  to health  might  be in
order. Contingent  on  the continued  growth  of a literature  on the  price
elasticities  of different  public  services,  this  could  be a promising  avenue
for  future  research,  although  implementation  could  be constrained  by heavy
data  requirements.
Providina  better  incentives  throuah  less  centralized  institution.
Public  sector  management  is partly  a question  of applying  a range  of
techniques  from  budgeting  to personnel  administration.  These  techniques  are
obviously  important factors in improving investment performance, and it is
important  for  staff  to receive  adequate  training  and  technical  assistance.
However,  these  are issues  that are  not  germane  to infrastructure  and  are  not
treated  any furtheL  here.  Public  management  is also  a  question  of building
incentives  within  institutions  where  objectives  may  not  be clear  and
competitive  pressures  may  not  exist,  leading  to a lack  of accountability  and
undermotivated  workers. Many  have argued  that,  in  order  to address  such
incentive  issues  within  government,  more  than  a piecemeal  reform  of public
administration  will  be necessary. In  this  regard,  two initiative.  have
received  much  attention  lately  in  the field  of infrastructure  --
decentralization  and  privatization.
The  debate  about  decentralization  ranges  over  a wide set  of issues
regarding  the  appropriate  balance  of financial  and  administrative
responsibility  among  central  governments,  sub-national  (state  and local)
sSee  also  the  discussion  in  Atkinson  and  Stiglitz,  1980  or Stern,  1987  for
a full  discussion  of optimal  public  pricing  and  how  the  principles  are similar
to those  of  the optimal  taxation  literature.44
governments and the institutions and communities themselves.'  It is an issue
that is particularly important for human infrastructure where the provision
and financing of infrastructure services has traditionally been very heavily
centralized (Winkler,1991; World Bank, 1993).  The issue is whether more
decentralization would be desirable on efficiency grounds.  There are two
principal arguments.  One is largely technical.  The scale economies in
providing infrastructure services may be overestimated, once administrative
and information costs are taken into account.  For example, when even small
questions have to be referred to central authorities (such as individual
curricula in schools), unit costs tend to be very high.  Also, central
authorities may have less information than those who run the facilities
leading to misallocation regarding input  mixes.  The other argument is
incentive based --  centralized institutions, compared to local institutions,
are not as accountahle to those they serve, precisely because the client group
is not the funding source.
While there are not yet many empirical studies, the initial evidence
tends to support these propositions. A study by Jimenez and Paqueo (1993)
indicates that, in the Philippines, unit costs in schools where parents
contribute more to financing tend to be lower than other schools when quality
is held constant.  A similar finding is reported by James et al. (1993) for
Indonesia.
Implementing decentralization reform is also an important issue.
Reforms to decentralize health care provision and education in Chile have been
generally successful in delivering more services to where they are needed, but
the implementation process has been more difficult and slower than
anticipated.  Getting local authorities prepared for taking on a different
role takes time and effort (Castaneda, 1992).
XIn a world of many communities, each with a different tax and package of
public  infrastructure  (as well  as other  services), if people  are  perfectly
mobile, an optimal allocation of public goods will result.  In this Tiebout-
world,  consumers  reveal  their  preferences by  moving,  yielding  an  efficient
market-like solution. But inter-jurisdictional  spillovers  and  moving costs imply
that higher tiers of government may have to intervene in such a world, taking
into account these externalities and scale economies in service provision.45
By contrast to human infrastructure, physical infrastructure services
tend to be provided by semi-autonomous,state-owned enterprises or by line
units of municipalities and other sub-national agencies.  This can lead to
principal-agent type issues about the ability of the central government (the
principal) to affect the behavior of the provider of the service (the  agent)
when the two actors may have different objectives and information bases.  One
example would be if the central government is interested in a provider being
an employer of large scale while the agent is trying to minimize costs (see
Galenson, 1989 for the case of roads).  However, there have been few studies
that have posed the problem in this way in infrastructure and none that have
addressed it empirically.
A more extensive discussion has emerged regarding privatization and how
it can improve incentives in physical infrastructure.  The argument is that,
in many cases, the public sector has taken on more than it should --  after
all, the market failures described above probably do not apply to the same
degree for every infrastructure service.  Indeed, in the early years of many
industrial countries, basic infrastructure --  such as roads, railways, power
and even education --  was financed and built mainly by private entrepreneurs
and organizations (Roth, 1988).  Disengaging the public sector in situations
where its role as a provider is not justified would allow (a)  a private sector
that is more subject to competitive pressures to provide the services more
efficiently; and (b)  the public sector to focus its limited financial and
administrative capacity on those services where market failures are indeed
important and public provision in some form is required.  There are issues
associated with each point.
For what types of infrastructure services would a greater private sector
involvement be viable and efficient?  It is important to distinguish among
various types of services, and within services, types of activities, because
they have different characteristics.  Some infrastructure services, for
example, are not subject to scale economies and are more easily characterized
by perfect competition, such as trucking and bus services.  Private provision
is likely to lead to efficiency gains in this case, unless there are barriers
to entry due to regulatory restraints.  The evidence on this point has so far46
only  been illustrative  and relies  on simply  comparing  the  unit  costs  of public
and  private  providers  of a given  service  to infer  what  the efficiency  gain.
might  be from  privatization,  without  rigorous  controls  to ensure  strict
comparability. For  example,  data for  urban  transport  show  that,  in cities
where  bus services  are  provided  by both  public  and  private  operators,  the cost
per  passenger  is lower  for  private  operators  than  for  public  operators,
despite  the fact  that the  public  services  are  invariably  highly  subsidized.
For  these  same cities,  the  public  operators  have a lower  fleet  utilization
rate,  a higher  staffing  ratio  and  a  greater  incidence  of fare  evasion  than
unsubsidized  private  operators.
Ratio  of per  passenger  private  cost  to public
cost  of comparable  bus  services,  1985
Ankara  .48  Jakarta  .50
Bangkok  .63  Karachi  .36
Calcutta .37  Khartoum  .40
Istanbul .85
Source:  World  Bank,  1988c,  calculated  from  Table  6.3
Recent  case  studies  on roads  have found  that  the  unit  cost  of road  maintenance
done directly  by government  agencies  is  about  60  percent  higher  than  that of
work done  by private  contractors  in  Brazil  (World  Bank,  1988b). Such  cost
comparisons  need  to be done  more  carefully,  however,  to ensure  that  all  the
components  of cost  are  taken  into  account  even  for  the  private  sector.
But for  many infrastructure  services,  there  are  barriers  to entry
(either  regulatory  or technological)  as  well  as scale  economies  that inhibit  a
large  number  of private  firms  from  operating  profitably. Thus,  it is
important  to consider  the  market  structure  that  results  from  a privatization
effort,  since  a regulated  private  monopoly  is not  necessarily  more efficient
than a  well-run,  publicly-owned  utility."
"For  example,  prior  to its  break-up  in 1983,  the  Bell  telephone  system  in
the U.S.  provided  excellent  service  (and  returns  to its  investors)  but it  was
needlessly  expensive.  The  company  was  able  to  justify  high  local  rates  by  adding
to its  cost  base.  (When  broken  up,  Bell  quickly  shed  many  of  its  prestigious  but
not  directly  profitable  operations,  including  its  theoretically-inclined  economic
research  staff  and  academic  economics  journal.) Such a monopoly  puts a heavy47
A useful  framework for discusoing this question ls contestability
analysis,  under  which  competitive  pressures  can  result  from  potential  as well
as actual  current  rivals. Thus,  unlike  perfect  competition,  it  is compatible
with  the  presence  of scale  economies  and,  consequently,  a  miall  number  of
large  firms  subject  to the  threat  of entry.  Even  monopolists  in a perfectly
contestable  market  cannot  earn  excessive  profits  since  these  would  be a proflt
opportunity  for  potential  entrant. The key  is free  entry  and  exit into  the
market.
This analysis  has  been applied  to the case  of infrastructural
deficiencies  in  Nigeria,  where  a  public  sector  utility  such  as the  electric
power  authority  is  often  characterized  by severe  shortcomLngs  in operation  and
maintenance,  as  well as in administrative  and  financial  management. Baumol
and  Lee (1991)  conclude  that the  most  promising  way to correct  these
inefficiencies  is  to institute  regulatory  changes  that  would  allow  greater
participation  of the  private  sector  --  such  as allowing  private  firms  to sell
any  excess  power  to the  public  agency  or to other  firms  to make the  electric
utility  market  more  nearly  contestable. Scale  economies  would  allow  these
private  firms,  which  already  have  generating  capacity  because  of  unrellable
public  supplies,  to lower  their  costs. Another  regulatory  change  would  be to
let  industrial  areas  to manage  "utility  pools",  not  only for  power  but also
for  other  public  services,  such  as  water  supply,  garbage  collection  and
telecommunications.
In  such  analyses,  unbundling  activities  within  sectors  is  an  important
concern,  since  the  market  for  some  act'vities  may  be  more  contestable  than
others. For  example,  in  power,  even  though  natural  monopolies  exist  in  the
transmission  and  distribution  of electricity,  generation  can  be done  by  mall
producers,  who  can sell  it  to consumers  through  public  utilities. In
burden  on the  regulatory  authorities  to  monitor  the  firm  closely  and  to develop
innovative  incentive  schemes  --  a difficult  task,  particularly  in developing
countries.
2Baumol  and  Lee  (1991)  provide  a  very  useful  primer,  with  an  application  for
infrastructure  services  in developing  countrles.  For a more comprehensive
treatment,  see  Baumol,  Panzar,  and  Willig  (1988).48
addition,  services  that  used  to be  done  by public  agencies  ar-  now  being
contracted  out, such  as stevedoring  in Chile  or the sale  of railway  tickets  in
Korea.  In  Cote  d'Ivoire,  the  public  authority  in charge  of  water  supply  is
responsible  for  owning  and  financing  the fixed  assets  while  a private  company
is  responoible  for  operations  and  maintenance. contracting  out  is also  being
tried  in  education,  as in Chile  and  also  in  the Philippines  where  there  was
exploratory  scheme  to allow  the  public  school  enrollment  surplus  to be
educated  in  private  schools  for  a fee (World  Bank,  1989). Rigorous  evaluation
summarizing  the lessons  learned  from  these  schemes  have  yet  to be conducted.
Even  when  these  services  are  provided  privately,  the  government  still
has  a role,  for  example,  in  ensuring  that  acceptable  safety  and  environmental
standards  are  met  and  that  the  poor  have  access  to certain  key services. It
would  be important  to consider  efficiency  criteria  in  meeting  such  objectives
(see,  for  example,  Eskeland  and  Jimenez,  1993,  on the  choice  of  policy
instruments  in pollution  control  and  Lipton  and  Ravallion's  chapter  in  this
volume  and  Grosh,  1993,  on targeting  public  expenditures  towards  the  poor).
Also,  the  emphasis  on away  from  almost  universal  direct  provision  towards
selective  intervention  in (and  effective  regulation  of)  certain  activities
entails  a  fundamental  way  in  which  many  governments  do  business.  For  example,
regulatory  interventions  must ensure  that  they  do not  themselves  become
barriers  to  entry  for  private  sector  involvement.  One  major  impediment  to
direct  private  sector  investment  is  the risk  that future  price  controls  or
government  interventions  will reduce  the returns  to that investment.  Another
barrier  is  most  governments'  underdeveloped  capacity  to design,  award  and
supervise  contracts  that  assure  equitable  risk  sharing  and  good  performance.
A promising  initiative  in  public-private  partnership  in  infrastructure  is  to
operate  on  a  "build-operate-and-transfer"  (BOT) or  "build-own-and-operatew
(BOO) basis,  under  which  a  private  firm  finances  some  or  all  of  the  initial
investment  and  is  remunerated  directly  from  revenues  earned  by  the  project  by
selling  the  facility  or  output  to  a  public  utility.  An example  of  this  is  a
recent  scheme  in  Pakistan  in  which  eight  power  generation  projects,  joint
ventures  by  consortia  of  domestic  and  foreign  contractors  and  worth  about  $2
billion,  were  packaged,  including  provisions  for  the  repatriation  of  profits49
and  guaranteed  purchase  and  prlce  agreements  between  the  power  generators  and
tho natlonal  utilitLes. BOT schemes  provlde  for  the  eventual  transfer  of
ownershLp  to  the  state,  when  prlvate  firms  do not  want to assume  the  rLsks  and
llabillty  of operatlng  the facillty. A recent  survey  LndLiates  that  slnce  the
early  1980e,  almost  BOT-type  Lnfrastructure  projects  have  been funded
worldwlde  at  cost  of over $60  bLilLon  (World  Bank,  1994).
Whether  the  prLvate  sector  or local  communLtLes  respond  to thLs
challenge  will  depend  upon local  organizatLonal  abilities,  as well  as  on the
rLsks  they face  lf  they  do not respond. A case  study  of 31 vlllages  ln  upland
South  Indla  suggests  that,  where  the risks  of crop  loss  and  conflict  caused  by
water  shortage  are hlgh,  villages  tended  to organLze  local  Lnfrastructure  at
lLttle  cost,  ignorLng  the  offlclally-established  local  government  ln  the
process  (Wade,  1988).
Political  economy. There  are  several  Lisues  of  polltlcal  economy  that
can  affect  lnfrastructure  lnvestment.  One is  that some  Lnfrastructure
investment  is  undertaken  for  non-economic  reasons,  such  as natlonal  securlty
(transport)  or natlonal  unlty  (education).  These  must be taken  lnto  account
in  the  process  of plannlng  Lnfrastructure  investment.
Another  iLsue  is  that  Lnfrastructure,  like  most other  public  spendlng,
ie subject  to "capture"  by special  lnterest  groups. In  human  resources,  thli
phenomenon  has  been  blamed  for  the fact  that  publLc  lnvestment  places  such  a
heavy  emphasis  on tertlary  levels  (universLties  and  urban-based  hospltal  care)
as  opposed  to prlmary  levels  (basic  educatlon  and  health  care),  even  when the
latter  have  hlgher  rates  of return  and  are  more equltably  distrlbuted
(BLrdsall  and  James,  1993,  forthcomlng).  Thls  has  been  attributed  to the
power  of urban  dwellers  to exercLie  more Lnfluence  over  resource  allocation.
PolitLcal  economy  can  also  be  at the  root  of the  problem  of quallty,
whlch  is llnked  to underLnvestment  ln  operatlons  and  malntenance  (O&M),
partlcularly  ln spendlng  on non-wage  categories.  As polnted  out  by Boller
(1976,  1992),  governments  tend:
"...  to concentrate  thelr  efforts  on new lnvestments  and fallure  to
provlde  adequately  for  the  recurrent  costs  of operatlng  and  maLntainLng
previous  projects. Sectors  in  which  there  have  been  the largest
shortfalls  Ln  O&M  are,  typlcally,  road  networks,  public  and  governmentso
buildings, agricultural equipment, and communications equipment."
(Heller, 1992, p. 52.)
One problem is that the incentives of various decision-makers are often
biased.  Large economic rents in new construction lead to a coincidence of
interests among beneficiary groups, the politicians they lobby and, finally,
bureaucrats from infrastructure agencies, all of whom may benefit more from
starting new projects rather than maintaining old ones.  The resulting
decision-making process leads to large suboptimal investments, even in
developed countries.  In the United States, for example, the value of
irrigated water to some 146,000 farms served by the Bureau of Reclamation
amounted to nearly $15 billion or 56 percent of the average market value of
irrigated land.  The 6 percent of all farmers who receive the subsidy are
among the richest in the nation (Repetto, 1986).
In some infrastructure services, particularly in the area of human
capital, the problem is not so much excessive new investment as
underinvestment in the non-wage component of O&M.  Strong labor market actions
by education and health care workers often lead to protection of wage payments
when budgets become tighter.  In C8te d'Ivoire, for example, the proportion of
the budget devoted to the wage bill went up, while the proportion going on
materials fell between 1975 and 1986.  Over that period, the results were a
lack of teaching materials and drugs, dilapidated and unsanitary conditions
and an overall decline in quality that seriously undermined productivity
(World  Bank, 1992c).
4.  Pricine Infrastructure Services
Recently, international institutions have been advocating pricing reform
in public infrastructure as another way to address many of the issues outlined51
in  the  previous  section." From  given  low  levols,  raLsing  prices  can  mobilize
revenue  that  can  be used  to increase  the  acceusibility  and improve  the quality
of services. At the same  time,  demand  management  will  reduce  waste.  If done
selectively  so  that  prices  for  services  consumed  by the  rich  are raised,  there
could  even  be a salutary  effect  on equity.
This section  first  reviews  some  basic  principles  of public  pricing,
before  discussing  the  recent  issues  in  human  and  physical  infrastructure.
8oam Basic  Principles
The  basic  principles  for  public  pricing  are  well established  in public
finance  (see  Atkinson  and Stiglits  1980). Efficiency  requires  prices  to be
set  according  to social  marginal  cost. When  there  are  no externalities,
market  imperfections  or  other  distortions,  and  when  goods  and  services  are
traded  freely  in  the  private  market,  the  appropriate  reference  point  would  be
the  prevailing  price.  For  goods  that are  not  traded  privately,  such  as  most
infrastructure  services,  the ineremental  opportunity  cost  of resources  used in
production  must  be considered. In  these  cameo,  the  public  authority  must also
take into  account:  (i)  externalitioe  (whether  positive,  such  as decreasing  the
incidence  of communicable  diseases  through  a health  project,  or negative,  such
as  the increased  pollution  caused  by the increase  in  traffic  induced  by a new
road);  (ii)  scale  economies,  caused  by large  fixed  costs  which,  in turn,  imply
that  marginal  cost  pricing  cannot  recover  costs;  (iiJ)  incomplete  markets
(such  as  underdeveloped  financial  credit  markets  for  education  or insurance
markets  for  health);  and (iv)  the administrative  costs  of collecting  certain
kinds  of charges  (such  as  monitoring  volumes  of water  used  by a large  number
of users  or being  able  to  exclude  nonpayers). In addition,  prices  may take
into  account  distributional  and  financial  objectives. The  main issues  in
"Publications  by  the  World  Bank  on  the  following  sectors  all  contain  these
points:  health  (World  Bank,  1987);  water  (World  Bank,  1992,  forthcoming);  energy
and power (World  Bank, 1992b)t  roads (Heggie,  1991);  education (World  Bank,
1986).52
practice  arise  in  how  those  principles  are  applied  in specific  sectors.0
Another  consideration  that  has  more  recently  been  considered  in the
pricing  literature  is  the fiscal  context. While  the fiscal  crises  of the
1980s  which  confronted  many  developing  country  governments  drew attention  to
this issue,  the  principles  behind  the  approach  were  more  general  and
rigorously  rooted  in ideas  developed  in  modern  public  finance. 3 1 Public
pricing  decisions  need  to take into  account  the  overall  budget  constraint
since  alternative  forms  of raising  revenues  through  taxes  on commodities,
trade,  or labor  would  inevitably  introduce  distortions  elsewhere  in the
economy. Distortion-free  lump-sum  taxes  are infeasible  and  there  are  economic
limits  to which  governments  can  rely  on the inflation  tax (which  may introduce
its  own  distortions)  and increasing  the  deficit. Prices  charged  by public
enterprises  can  thus  be an  efficient  alternative  in  raising  revenues. The
result  is that  governments  may  provide  a lower  subsidy  for  services  for  which
there  a-e large  externalities,  once  the fiscal  objective  is considered.
Indeed,  prices  may generally  exceed  the  marginal  costs  as conventionally
calculated.
If one  were  to assume  that  the  profits  and  losses  of the  public  agency
(or  state-owned  enterprise)  delivering  the infrastructure  service  were simply
passed  on to the  central  government,  then,  the  analytical  problem  of deriving
optimal  prices  would  be analytically  the  same  as  that  of setting  optimal
taxes.  It is  beyond  the scope  of this  paper  to derive  these  formulas,  which
are  discussed  more fully  elsewhere  (see  the  references  in footnote  30).  This
approach  is  very  data intensive. Even  under  the  strong  assumption  that  prices
elsewhere  in  the  economy  are  constant  (if  they  were not,  addressing  this  fully
would  require  a computable  general  equilibrium  model),  the  estimates  of fiscal
"A recent  review  of infrastructure  pricing  at the  World Bank (Julius  and
Alicbusan  1988)  indicated  that  while it  is standard  policy  to compute  marginal
cost  and  explicitly  adjust  it  to  take  those  considerations  into  account,  many  of
the  adjustments  are  not  done  in practice.
3 "The  classic  reference  is  Diamond  and  Hirrlees  (1971). Treatments  in the
tradition  of the recent  public  finance  literature,  see  Atkinson  and Stiglits
(1980). For  applications  in some  of the  sectors  of concern  in  this  paper,  see
Katz (1987),  Besley  (1989b),  Hammer  (1993),  and  Heady  (1988).53
gains would require a calculation of the change in demand of the service in
question as well as the cross-price elasticities of other services that serve
as substitutes and complements.  Estimating the distortionary cost or "excess
burden" would require similar data (although  one would want the compensated
demands of the relevant goods).
These ideas have been applied in a much more simplified way to the more
limited (and arguably short-term) problem of setting prices within a sector or
service (as opposed to setting prices optimally over the full range of
government services), when the subsidy required is less than what is optimal.
The partial equilibrium diagram of Figure 1 illustrates some of the basic
arguments.  Let Dp  and D,  denote private and social demand curves.  D.  is to
the right of Dp  because of externalities.  The optimal quantity of the
service, q*, will only be consumed with an optimal unit subsidy equivalent to
a* - c - p*, where c depicts marginal cost (assumed to be constant without
loss of generality) and p* indicates the private cost to the individual, who
must then pay a fee equivalent to p* - cp,  the private costs of going to
school.  This means that total subsidy is So  =  S*  =  cq*.  When do these
arguments justify a zero price, the most popular option for many social
services?  The optimal fee is zero only if the marginal private benefit curve
crosses cp  at q*, or if the administrative costs of collecting the fee (not
drawn) outweigh the benefits.
(Figure 1 about herel
What happens when there are budgetary restraints?3  Second-best
principles apply.  The government is restricted to financing the cost of
providing a public service, cq, out of a given subsidy budget, SI  and the
proceeds from a user charge, pq.  Then, the iso-subsidy locus, which shows the
combinations of q and p that would be consistent with a given unit cost of
provision c and a budget SI,  is in effect the supply curve.  The optimal
subsidy in Figure 1 is So,  but the optimum is not available in this case.  The
distance between the locus and the constant marginal cost of providing the
2See  Thobani (1983),  Jimenez (1987),  Besley (1989b)  and  Katz (1987)  for  more
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service is the amount that needs to be "recovered" from the users.  Given the
binding budget constraint", at a price Pb,  there would be excess demand
equivalent to qDq*.  A unit price increase of c - pi  would be welfare improving
by the amount of the area ADFB.  Essentially, the intuitive rule in this case
would be to raise fees until the excess demand disappears.
The rest of this section discusses the extent to which these ideas have
been applied to human and physical infrastructure in theory and in practice.
Human Infrastructure3
Over the past 10 years, the concept of pricing education and health has
once more come to the fore as a means to address some of the efficiency and
equity issues outlined in Section 3.  It is here that the proposed changes
have been most different from past practice and advice.
Past Practice and suaoested reforms.  The majority of education and
health services in developing countries are provided by central governments.
These services are very heavily subsidized, to the extent that they are
usually provided free, or almost free.  In addition, there are often
restrictions on the level of fees that private providers can charge users.
While it is difficult to get an accurate measure of the share of
recurrent costs recovered through user charges (because definitions and
categories of budgetary flows are not systematically monitored
internationally), Table 9 provides rough estimates for a sample of countries.
The cost figures do not account for the possibility of distorted prices, but
the data are indicative and show that there is some variation across countries
but that overall the shares are generally very low.
"The budget constraint would not  be binding if  SO  were to cross the private
demand curve beyond q*.
3Many of the ideas in this chapter are taken from Jimenez (1987, 1990).
However, this chapter provides a conceptual and empirical update.
3While systematic evidence on the amount of public expenditures that is
recovered is  not available,  there is  much country-specific  evidence  that the  most
popular pricing scheme is zero-pricing, at least officially (see, for example,
World Bank, 1986, 1987a).  This does not include "unofficial"  prices charged by
providers for access to rationed services.55
rhU.  - C.U-Recovey R  X in Fdamk,  In Dewlopag  CXnmWoo  ewdy iflUs
% of countries  Uses  fees as  Nuwber of
with no fees  % of unit cost  countas
Education
Primary  39  8  36
Secondary  25  15  36
Higher  30  8  30
Healtht/  n.a  7  17
Source: Jbnenez, 1987.
5'  % of recurrent  public healtr expenditure  covered  by userfees
n.a = not  avaiable
Rocent  studies,  many  sponsored  by  multilateral  financial  institutions
like  the  World  Bank (for  summaries  of this  debate,  see  World  Bank,  1986,
1987ai  Jimenez,  1990s  and  Creese,  1992)  have  argued  that  present  pricing  rules
ought  to be changed  to improve  efficiency  and  equity. In particular,  the
literature  focuses  on three  points. First,  despite  evidence  that  more
investment  in  education  and  health  is still  profitable,  there  are  severe
constraints  to  tapping  further  central  government  sources.  Second,  uniformly
low  prices  mean  that  expensive  services  are  subsidized  more than  cheaper  ones,
which leads  to the  poorest  having  little  access  to subsidies. Third,  the
limited  resources  devoted  to  social  services  are  often  badly  used.  While  the
exact  recommendations  vary,  the  common link  among  them  is  the  idea  that
policies  that  differentiate  prices  by  type  of  service  and  by  type  of  consumer
are  generally  more  efficient  and  equitable  than  low  and  uniform  price
policies.  The  rest  of  this  section  reviews  the  conceptual  arguments  and  the
mpLrical evidence  regarding  this  proposition.56
The  principal  recommendations  have  been  debated  in  the  past  eight  to ten
years,  in  both the  research  and  policy  literature.  They include  the
following:
0  Increase  prices  for  some  social  services  that have  large  private
benefits  and  are  consumed  by the  relatively  well-off. For  many
countries,  these  services  include  higher  education  or curative  care
in urban  hospitals. The  extent  of the increases  will have  to be
tailored  to the  availability  of credit  (for  education)  and insurance
(for  health)  markets.
O  Invest  revenues  in socially-profitable  services,  focusing  on
expanding  quantity  (such  as primary  education,  primary  health  care)
or on quality  (such  as non-wage  recurrent  expenditure  categories).
O  Protect  the  poor's  consumption  of  the services,  with increased
prices  through  categorical  targeting  or,  where  feasible,  means
testing.
O  Make institutional  changes  to develop  credit  and insurance  markets,
particularly  in education  and  health  respectively,  as well as  to
liberalize  overly-centralized  provision,  thus  giving  institutions,
local  communities  and  private  providers  more responsibility.
Efficiencys  some  conceptual  issues. What  are  the  efficiency
justifications  for  these  proposals? One  argument  is  that  the  reasons  for
heavily-subsidized  (and,  in  some  cases,  free)  provision  are  not  warranted  for
all  types  of social  services. Externalities,  for  example,  may hold  more for
primary  education  and  less  for  higher  education  (World  Bank,  1986).
Similarly,  the  benefits  of curative  health  care  and  a clean  water  supply  are
particularly  considered  to  be private,  whereas  those  of preventive  care  could
have  external  benefits. The  empirical  evidence  offered  in  the literature  on
these issues,  already  been  reviewed  earlier,  is still  relatively  limited,
mSee, for  example,  World  Bank (1986,  1987a),  de Ferranti  (1985),  Jimenes
(1986b,  1987),  Griffin  (1987)  and  Briscoe (1993). For examples  of dissenting
vices,  see  Abel-Smith  (1987),  Bray (1986),  Gilson  (1988).57
which  is surprising  given  the  central  role  that  the  argument  currently  play.
in shaping  policy.
Information  about  benefits  is  particularly  important  for  health. The
asymmetry  of information  between  provlder  and  user  has long  been recognized  as
one  of the  most important  roadblocks  to relying  only  on private  insurance  as a
cost-efficient  system. Profit-maximizing  providers  could  have  a moral  hazard
problem  in  prescribing  high-cost  treatments. In  this  case,  subsidizing
provision  could  be important  for  users. However,  subsidies  alone  will not
solve  the  problem  and  could  exacerbate  it  if providers  know  users  havq  access
to the "deep  pockets"  of government. There  is  more of an argument  for
increasing  regulation  or for  eliminating  the  moral  hazard  problem  through  pre-
payment  arrangements  in  which  both  the  provider  and  consumer  have  a stake  in
keeping  the latter  healthy  (health  maintenance  organizations  are  motivated  by
this  principle).
Another  argument  for  reconsidering  pricing  options  in  the social  sectors
is fiscal  --  for  a  variety  of reasons,  budgets  are  severely  restrained,  even
though  the returns  to some  lnvestments  are  high.  There  are  several  reasons
for  this  outcome  that have  been discussad  earlier. For  example,  the  costs  of
mobilizing  revenues  through  general  taxes  are  particularly  high  in developing
countries  because  of their  heavy  reliance  on  distortionary  indirect  domestic
and  trade  taxes (World  Bank,  1991b;  Newbery  and  Stern,  1987). Also,  central
governments  fail  to allocate  sufficient  amounts  from  the  main treasury  because
of technical  constraints  (such  as the failure  to measure  benefits  and  costs  of
social  programs  accurately  in  order  to make  the appropriate  investment
choices)  or because  of political  roadblocks  (see  Birdsall  and  James,  1993).
But  the  welfare  improvement  from  a fee  increase  is dependent  not  only  on
demand-side  paramsters,  but  also  on the supply  responsiveness  of providers.
The  foregoing  analysis  assumes  that increased  prices  will finance  service
expansion. Thus,  in  evaluating  the  welfare  implications,  it is also  important
to capture  supply  responses. This is  true  not  only for  quantity  but also  for
quality,  which  is often  sacrificed  in  a budget-restrained  environment. Some
analysts  have argued  that  fee  revenues  can  be earmarked  for  certain  non-wage58
operations and maintenance spending since this is where government tends to
underspend (Heller, 1976).
What evidence is there that these effects are important?  The ultimate
objective of policy reform is to maximize social welfare.  However, this is
too general to be useful as an operational criterion for making an empirical
evaluation of policy change.  The literature has instead focused on various
arguments for pricing reform --  namely that increasing prices will:
(a) increase government revenues, which can be used to expand the supply and
quality of priority services; (b) stimulate the use and consumption of those
services; and (c) improve key indicators, such as gains in consumer surplus or
by direct measure of health and educational outcomes, such as health status or
literacy (although attribution may be difficult due to lags between policy
changes and expected impacts).
The growing literature on price effects in the use of education and
health are of roughly two types: (i) studies that primarily simulate the
revenue, supply, use and welfare effects and (ii)  those that attempt to
monitor the impact of actual attempts to raise prices.  Both types of
evaluations are reviewed here.
Efficiency: evidence from simulation studies.  Some policy studies have
simply used some rough order of magnitude to get a sense of what kinds of
financing can be generated if demand were completely inelastic and a price
increase were used to finance service expansion.  The results can be dramatic.
For example, it has been estimated that the impact of raising user costs in
higher education, by eliminating university stueent allowances and introducing
tuition payments to cover operating costs, would be sufficient to finance
substantial increases in enrollment ratios in some countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa (Table 10).59
Tal  10. Potentdal  Impact  on Primary  Education  In Afdca of Increasing  Fees  In Higher  Education
Potenialprlmary  enrollment
ratio  with  ful  cost  recovery  In
Country  Current  enroltlent ratio  higher  education  aS
Benin  65  81
Burkina  Faso  20  25
Central African  Republic  68  79
Congo  n.a.  n.a.
Cote d'lvoire  76  100
Malawi  59  91
Mali  27  35
Niger  23  26
Senegal  48  81
Sudan  51  73
Tanzania  n.a.  n.a.
Tongo  n.a.  n.a.
Average  49  66
n.a.  Not available
/  Full cost recovery refrs  to the climnination  of university  student  allowances  and introduction  of tuition  prvmcnts  to
cover operating  costs.
Source:  World Bank  (1986, pp. 22, 23).
Such estimates are only illustrative of what is feasible.  More recent
studies incorporate behavioral concerns.  The general empirical approach is to
use micro-econometric techniques to estimate the effects price changes have on
behavior and then to use the results as parameters to simulate the eventual
effects on the use and availability of the service.
Most of the studies focus on the demand side to estimate the effects of
price changes on utilization and revenue.  A series of studies on the impacts
of price changes on health demand has been done on Malaysia (Heller, 1982);
the Philippines (Akin  et al., 1986); C8te d'Ivoire (Dor and van der Gaag, 1987
and Gertler and van der Gaag, 1991); Ghana (Gertler and van der Gaag 1991 and
Lavy and Quigley, 1991); Kenya (Ellis  and Mwabu, 1991; Mwabu, 1986 and Mwabu
et al., 1992); Nigeria (Akin et al., 1991); Peru (Gertler et al., 1987) and
Pakistan (Alderman and Gertler, 1989).  While a detailed review of these
studies is beyond the scope of this paper, a general outline of the procedures
used would be useful.
Discrete choice models are typically used to obtain estimates of demand
price elasticities.  The left-hand side dependent variable is often measured60
as the incidence of use of various kinds of health facilities (for example,
private doctor, public facility, traditional healer), through the Lavy and
Quigley study is different in that it also measures intensity of use.  These
price elasticities are then used to show how revenues will be affected by
increasing prices, as measured by independently-collected unit price. in a
locality or as proxied by the time costs of access.  Table 11 shows some basic
results.  A common finding is that the utilization of health services tends to
be relatively price inelastic, so that a unit increase in prices will lead to
an increase in revenues.  Moreover, these are estimates at a single point
along the demand curve --  many of the studies show that demand may be
relatively more price elastic at lower levels of utilization and income.
The models of education demand are similar to those of health (Peru,
Gertler and Glewwe 1990; Malawi, Tan et al., 1984).  More measures are used
for demand.  At the household level, it could be the number of children in
school; at the individual level, the use of various types of discrete
categories of education facilities and completed years of schooling (relative
to the number of years possible) are also used.  The qualitative results, also
shown in Table 11, do not differ much from those found in health.61
Table  11.  lWeM  Elkscsdes  of Demad  for Health wad  Ead kn  Senees
Pflce  ekwdcIt.
by Income group
Year  of  P?Ice  range  Lowest  Highaes
Dam  Count  and  sreice  (U.S.  doem)  Overall  qaik  quarlk
Health
198S  Cote d'lvoire
Clinic  Free to $.1  n.a.  -0.61  -0.38
$.11 to S.22  na.  -1.16  -0.05
Hospital  Free to S.11  n.a.  40.47  40.29
$.11 to 8.22  n.a.  -0.86  -O.51
1985  Peru'
Private doctor  Free to $1.56  -0.14  -0.20  .0.06
S1.56 to 3.12  -0.29  .44  -0.12
Hospital  Free to $1.S6  -0.41  -0.67  -0.33
81.56 to 83.12  -0.64  -1.18  -0.05
Clinio  Free to 81.56  -0.46  -0.76  -0.03
81.56  to $3.12  40.68  -1.28  -0.06
197S  Malaysia
Outpatient  visits  n.a.  -0.01  n.a.  n.a.
1981  Philippines
Prenatal  child care  n.a.  -0.01  n.a.  n.a.
198041  Kenya  $5.80  inelastick  n.a.  n.a.
1985  Ethiopia
Outpatient  care  n.a.  -0.0S  to -0.50  n.a.  n.a.
1986  Sudan  n.a.




education  Pree to 81.S6  -0.14  -0.18  -0.20
1982  Mali"  n.a.  -0.98  n.a.  n.a.
1983  Malawid  n.a.  -0.S2  n.a.  n.a.
n.a. Not available.
a.  Thaee are price elasticities,  which is why price ranges  are relevant.
b.  Us  household  enrollment  ratio as dependent  variable.
c.  Uses distance  as price variable.
d.  Magnitude  could not be computed  from available  data.
Sowrces: Gertler  and van der Gaag, 1988  for health in COts  d'lvoire and Peru; Gertler and Glewwe,  1988 for education  in
Peru; Alin et. al., 1986 for the Philippines;  Mwabu, 1988 for Kenya;  Dunlop, 1987 for Ethiopia;  Birdiall ct. al.,  1983 for
Mali; Tan et. al., 1984 for Malawi;  Schwabe,  n.d. for Sudan.
These price elasticities can be used to compute the welfare gain
associated with a price increase, given the budget-constrained analytical62
framework  outlined  above.37  The  estimated  revenue  generated  from  the  user
charges  'nn finance  either  an  expansion  of supply  or an improvement  in
quality. Some  of the studies  outlined  above  take  this additional  step  in the
analysis. For example,  Ellis  and  Mwabu (1991)  use  the quality  variables  being
held  constant  in the  demand  equation  to try  to infer  willingness  to pay for
marginal  changes  in some  of these  characteristics,  and  they  conclude  that
significant  quality  improvements  can  be financed  by user  charges  (Table  12).
Mwabu  et al. (1992)  finds  that,  in  Kenya,  the  availability  of drugs  and
trained  personnel  affects  demand  and  should  be taken  into  account  in  the
analysis.
Table 12. IndivIdual  WUlngness  to Pay  for Access  to Social  Services  and the Cost  of ProWvson
(1985  U.S. Dolars)
Willngness  to pay  for obtaining
access  to a nearby  facity  when the
alternative 
Couwntr  and service  One  hour  away  Two  hours away  Marginal
Cost
Mete  d'lvoire
West Forest Health Clinics  0.10  0.17  1.30
Savannah  Health Clinic  0.03  0.06  1.30
Peru
Coastal  Health Clinic  0.09  0.17  2.73
Sierra Health Clinic  0.00  0.02  2.73
Secondary  Schoolb  14.29  104.64  35.71
a.  Dollars per visit.
b.  Dollars per academic  year.
Sources:  Health: Gertler and  van der Gaag (1988,  Tables S and 6).  Education: Gertler and Glewwe  (1989).
3If  the  public  sector  rationed  efficiently  across  sectors,  the  shadow  value
of a  dollar  of  public  revenue  would  be sufficient  to infer  welfare  improvements.
However, the  pricing literature for  education and  health  assumes that
insufficient  funds  are  being  devoted  to education  and  health  services.63
While these recent studies have gone a long way towards addressing a
gap in policy analysis, the literature still needs to evolve.  First, future
policy work must have more studies on which to rely.  The methods and results
of the studies that are currently available are varied enough to caution
against deriving many conclusions that can be widely applied.  Future studies
will continue to confront the problem that little information is available
that combines users, socioeconomic characteristics with data on utilization
and on the characteristics of facilities like schools and hospitale.  For
example, the prices of using a service like education and health are very
difficult to obtain.  In education, many public schools charge no prices at
all; in health, provider-reported average prices of visits to clinics, such as
those used by Akin et al. (1985), do not take into account ad hoc price
discrimination by providers or the possible existence of health insurance,
both of which complicate pricing measurement.  Many studies have thus tended
to use proxy variables or indirect measures for prices, such as those from
hedonic price equations (for  example, Gertler et al., 1987), travel time (for
example, Dor et al., 1987 and Gertler and van der Gaag, 1990) or the charge at
the nearest alternative facility of each type (for example, Mwabu et al.,
1993).  It is thus difficult to compare the parameters estimated from the
studies.
Data concerns are being alleviated by recent initiatives to collect
multi-purpose surveys in developing countries.  One such initiative, the
Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) of the World Bank, has been applied
in almost a dozen countries and the data have been used in many of the studies
cited earlier (see  Grosh and Glewwe 1993 for a description).
There are also empirical challenges that go beyond data.  The studies
above tend to underestimate the true benefits of a policy reform if there are
externalities and no studies take such effects into account. Another issue is
that many of the empirical models impose a great deal of structure on
household models (such as logarithmical additive utility functions).  While
such models allow the analyst to map out the preference function and use it
for behavioral models, most of the studies have not tested for the robustness
of their conclusions in case other structures might imply different results.64
Finally, most of theae empirical studies are flawed by simplistic
assumptions about supply-side responses.  Most assume constant cost.  One
study that directly estimates the cost functions of the facilities to infer
what the supply response might be is that of Akin et al. (1991).  They use
this to do simulations on the effects of different types of investment policy.
Unfortunately, they use a very limited Nigerian sample that consists only of
those households that report an incidence of illness.  More studies about the
cost  structure  of  education  and  health  services  are  needed.
Another  assumption  is  that  resources  will  actually  be  used  to  finance
expansion  or  improvements  in  quality.  This  is  partly  dependent  on  the
specific actions of government and can only be evaluated on the basis of
actual experience.  Where this experience exists, this evidence will also be
useful to use against those who argue that such policy changes cannot be made
because of reasons of political or administrative costs.
Efficiency: evidence from actual experiments.  There have been
relatively few attempts to raise fees in education, health and water services,
and even fewer instances where such attempts have been rigorously documented
and evaluated.  In health, detailed case studies of four African, one Asian
and four Latin American countries have been documented; these include studies
in Ghana (Waddington and Emyimayew, 1989), Zaire (Creese, 1991), Swaziland
(Yoder), Lesotho (Creese, 1991), Bangladesh (Santon and Clemens, 1989),
Cameroon (Litvack and Bodart, 1992), Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica and
Brazil (Lewis, 1991a, b).8  These actual case studies share the following
conclusions.  First, they show that raising charges is feasible and that
political and administrative costs can be overcome.  This is particularly true
in health --  the evaluation of education reform has yet to be done.  In this
regard, incentives matter; hospitals and clinics that retained control of
their funds were able to generate more funds.
Second, the impact on revenue mobilization has also been positive --
user fees can raise substantial amounts, although it remains to be seen what
"There are  other cases in  which fee  increases  have  been attempted.  However,
either they have only just begun as experiments (such as in Indonesia) or they
have not been fully documented in scholarly work.65
the government has actually done with the money. In the Latin American
examples, the fees actually went to buy more supplies and drugs.
Third, the impact or.  the utilization of services is mixed.  In almost
all countries, utilization went down --  partly because the fees were raised
dramatically (so that this finding is not necessarily inconsistent with the
demand findings above).  But, in several other countries, they ;.ecovered  after
only two years.
The number of actual cases is still relatively small and is practically
non-existent in the case of education. Perhaps most important, the experiments
in the case studies are not rigorously designed.  These types of studies are
still being designed and until they are finished, the debate is likely to
continue to rage.
Equitv: some conceptual issues.  The earlier section has already shown
that free provision does not necessarily mean that the poorest income groups
have access to certain services.  There are several reasons for this.  one is
that, even at zero or a very low price, social services are costly to use.
The private cost includes payments for transport, materials (medicine in the
case of health, or school books in the case of education) and opportunity cost
(particularly high for education, but might be high in terms of waiting time
for other services).  For education, the opportunity cost alone can amount to
25 to 50 percent of the total social (private  plus public) cost of education
(Jimenez, 1987, p. 19).  Even though poor adults may have a lower opportunity
cost of time than richer adults, this relationship may be reversed for
children --  poor children may tend to work at home and may find it more
difficult to attend school.
Another reason is that, when demand is rationed, the rationing system
often favors those who are relatively well off, unless the services are
carefully and deliberately targeted.  For example, rationing of school places,
nominally by ability, may in fact favor richer households that can afford to
pay for tutoring or to let their children repeat a grade.  The same may be
true of rationing by concentrating the service in certain areas, like urban
centers.66
Rationing  by  means  of requiring  benefoiiaries  to  spend  time  waiting  for
a service  much  as  health  care  or  to travel  long  distances  for  water  can  favor
the  relatively  poor if the  price  of a  wait is  higher  to those  with a hlgher
opportunity  cost  of time (Briscoe  et al.,  1993). But  the  benefits  from
redistributing  income  in this  way should  be compared  to the  benefits  of
improved  beneflts  financed  by higher  taxes. Moreover,  the costs  can  be high
if  the government  can  redistribute  income  effectively  by direct  transfer.
(Bucovetaky,  1984)  or other  allocation  mechanisms  (Sah,  1987),  or if  the
benefits  are  unevenly  distributed  among  those  who  wait.
When such  considerations  are  important,  differential  prices  for
different  services  can significantly  improve  efficiency  and  equity. It has
been shown  empirically,  for  example,  that  higher  income  groups  tend  to benefit
disproportionately  from  higher  education,  so  that shifting  government  spending
from  that level  to  more  basic levels  will have  a  bigger  impact  on reducing
poverty  (World  Bank,  1986,  1987at  Mingat  and  Tan, 1985,  1986;  Griffin,  1992).
Moreover,  the  inequalities  of government  spending  have  also  been  used
an  an argument  for  using  targeting  to redistribute  wealth. The  benefits  and
costs  of targeting  are  discussed  more fully  in  the chapter  by Lipton  and
Ravallion. Recent  evidence  for  targeted  health  or educated  programs  indicate
that such  techniques  could  be administratively  feasible  (Grosh,  1993),
particularly  if they  do not involve  explicit  means  testing  but instead  target
by category  (such  as age,  gender  or location)  usLng  characteristics  that  are
highly  correlated  with indicators  of poverty.
Eauitv:  evidence. The  previous  section  has  shown  that  the  popular
method  for  ensuring  access  has  been  to provide  all  social  services  at a heavy
per  unit subsidy  through  uniformly  low  or zero  prices,  accompanied  by quantity
rationing  or low  quality  when  budgets  are  tight. This has  not  been  successful
as the  highest  subsidies  often  go to services  used  mainly  by the  rich  such  as
higher  education  and  urban-based  health  care.  In  principle,  differential
pricing  --  increasing  prices  (or  lowerlng  subsidies)  for  those  services  that
are consumed  primarily  by the  rich  and  increasing  subsidies  for  those  services
that are  consumed  primarily  by the  poor  --  is  bound  to have  beneficial67
effects, particularly when the initial differences in cost are  great and the
distribution of access to various service levels is very unequal.
For example, according to figures in Table 13, Asian countries fall
roughly into three groups: (i) those where education subsidies are roughly
equitably distributed according to levels of education (Korea and the
Philippines); (ii)  those with moderately equitable distribution. (China,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thailand); and (iii) those with
fundamentally inequitable distributions (Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Papua
New Guinea).  Since students from richer families will tend to be
overrepresented at higher levels of education, it can reasonably be concluded
that differential pricing would be more progressive in the last group of
countries.
Tabk  13. DisLlbuton of Publi  Spending on Educadon,  Seketed  Asia Counres, mid-1980s
Cwumuaie  spending
received  by 19  percent
best-educted
Ghn  (Vercentage  of total
Country  coefflcknit f  c  a  spending)
Bangladesh  81.9  71.7
China  44.4  31.1
India  65.8  60.8
Indonesia  27.3  21.4
Korea  15.9  13.4
Malaysia  37.9  32.0
Nepal  57.9  53.5
Papua New Guinea  62.1  53.5
PhiDppines  18.6  14.1
Sri Lanka  32.6  28.1
Thailand  32.9  23.3
Regional  avcragc  43.4  36.3
/  MThis  statistic  has a range of 0 to 100.  The closer it is to 100,  the more unequal  is the distribution  of public
spending  on education  in a school-age  population.
Source:  Tan and Mingat, 1992.
One  consideration is that there are relatively few human servLces that
are  not  consumed  by  rich  and  poor  alike.  Some  urban-based  specialty  hospitals68
cater solely to diseases that afflict the relatively wealthy, and, in Africa,
education is so selective that, by the tertiary level, the elite form a vast
majority of all applicants (World  Bank, 1986, 1987a).  However, in other
countries and services, the poor represent a minor but still significant
portion of students at primary or middle levels or of patients in urban
hospitals.  In these cases, it is important to measure the initial
distribution of subsidies very carefully and to make appropriate judgments as
to how they might change as a result of the change in policy.
Another consideration is that there may be externalities or other
reasons why ensuring that the poor have access to higher-level services is
important to a society.  There may also be political reasons for wanting to
guarantee, for example, that poor students who have managed to work their way
through secondary school have a chance to enter university or that poor
children with an operable heart condition have a chance to have life-saving
operations.  More importantly, there may be economic efficiency reasons for
this because credit mar':ets  for education and insurance markets for health are
only just starting up in many developing countries.  Such concerns are
validated some recent empirical work (Gertler et al., 1987; Gertler and van
der Gaag, 1988 and Gertler and Glewwe, 1989) that shows that the price
elasticity of demand for social services may be higher among the poor than
among the rich.  Thus, for a given price increase, the consumption of the poor
would fall proportionately more than that of the rich.  This is corroborated
by some recent case work in  Ghana.  When fees for attendance at health
stations were raised, there was an initial drop in attendance at urban-based
stations but the numbers soon went up again, whereas attendance at small,
rural-based health stations remained at a lower level, even after two and a
half years (Waddington and Enyimayew, 1989).
As a result, many argue that, where possible, user charges, even if
differentiated by type of service, should also be accompanied by more
narrowly-targeted subsidies to ensure that the poor continue to have access to
the service in question.  As reviewed in the chapter by Lipton and Ravallion,
however, the relative costs of various targeting mechanisms have to be weighed
carefully.  Means testing of individuals, while generally administratively69
costly  to implement,  may be quite  appropriate  for  relatively  small  programs
that  draw from  a limited  population  where  monitoring  in  easier  (see  Grosh  1993
for  a comprehensive  review). one  much  example  may  be university  scholarships
where a studentl'  background is arguably relatively easy to determine and
where  parents  are likely  to be reasonably  well educated  (see  Klitgaard,  1986
for  an interesting  discussion  of some  cases).
There  are  various  alternatives  to individual  means  testing. Studies  of
food  subsidies  have found  that  targeting  using  physical  criteria,  such  as
nutrition  level,  is  generally  more  effective  in  reaching  target  population.
and  in keeping  others  out  than  using  income  criteria,  although  individual
testing  may  be costly  (for  example,  see  Edirisinghs,  1987  and  Garcia  and
Pinstrup-Andersen,  1987). Similar  criteria  that have  been applied  in
developing  countries  are  health  status  (incidence  of certain  diseases)  or
adult  literacy  (Griffin,  1989). A more realistic  category  to use for
targeting  is  geographic  location. The  rule  of exempting  institutions  from
fees  in  urban  slums  or obviously  poor  rural  areas  also  makes  it  easier  to
implement. The one  drawback  is that,  if two  neighboring  locations  have  vastly
different  rates,  people  may  migrate  in  order  to qualify  for  the  cheapest
alternative  (Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin,  1986).
Self-selecting  mechanisms  are  often  suggested  as  a way  to target  in a
way  that  minimizes  the  administrative  burden. Most of  these  are  based  on the
concept  of quality. For  example,  long  waiting  lines  can  be used  to take
advantage  of the fact  that  the  opportunity  cost  of time is  greater  for  rich
than for  poor  people. Another  example  is  that  lower  quality  facilities  tend
to attract  only  the  poor (Besley  and  Coate  1992).
Feasibility. One aspect  of feasibility  is administrative  cost.  While
it is  true  that  public  administration  in  many  developing  countries  is
generally  weak,  a few  case studies  indicate  that  the administrative  problems
associated  with collecting  fees  can  generally  be overcome  if  the appropriate
incentives  are  put in  place. For  example,  the salaries  of the administrative
staff  could  be related  to the  amount  of fee income  they  recover. Even  more
importantly,  institutions  could  be allowed  to retain  a  percentage  of the fee
income  that  they raise. In  many  countries,  these  fees  must be remitted  to the70
central finance ministry.  According to Vogel (1988, 1991), in COte d'Ivoire
and Senegal, almost 100 percent of fees has to be handed over to the finance
ministry, while in Mali, it is all remitted to the central health ministry.
However, in Ghana, the institution was able to keep 25 percent.
The financial costs of recovering fees are not overwhelming.
Generally, the cost of collecting fees, including incentive payments to
collectors, amount to about 10 percent of total fees collected --  some
outliers indicate 25 percent (Vogel, 1988).  Hecht et al. (1992) documents a
plan for a relatively comprehensive reform proposal for price reform in
Zimbabwe, and concludes that fee collection is indeed administratively
feasible tsee also Wouters, 1991, and Yoder, 1989).
Another aspect of feasibility is political.  Governments may be acting
in their own rather than in the public interest.  Another possibility is that
some governments may be unable to withstand pressure from powerful minority
interests (Birdsall and James, 1993).  Such pressures may explain the
persistence of the unequal distributions found in certain countries in terms
of access to higher education and health care.
Political constraints can be a real barrier to reform.  However, it is
possible to take measures to counteract them.  One is to compensate those who
will lose out as a result of the reform and, at the same time, to mobilize
those who will gain from it.  This can only be done by a massive public
information campaign, as occurred in Ghana, to alert the population to the
inequities of the existing distribution of subsidies (World Bank, 1988c).
Another is to rely on rules rather than discretion --  for instance, by greater
earmarking.  This may not work if the discretionary portion of the funds is
used to counteract the non-discretionary portion.  Moreover, there may be
heavy efficiency losses associated with this (McCleary, 1988).
Conclusions.  In short, although there is much merit in the conceptual
arguments for increasing prices in the social sectors, empirical support is
only now beginning to build.  There is strong evidence that there is much room
for improvement, in that present subsidies could be directed more towards the
poor.  Moderate increases in user fees would raise revenues because demand is
relatively price inelastic, but dramatic increases designed to recover costs71
in full would not be feasible because of the lack of adequate credit or
insurance markets end because demand elasticities may rise.  Finally,
practical methods exist for protecting the poor.
The remaining problems are the need to:
*  asses the feasibility of measures to protect the poor;
*  reach agreement on which services should have fees raised and by how
much, in other words, a need for operational "rules of thumb";
*  gather information about the cost structure of service provision; and
*  make systematic evaluations of actual attempts to raise prices.
Physical Infrastructure
For most physical infrastructure services, the pricing discussion has
primarily been motivated by a different set of externalities than those
emphasized in human infrastructure, where most of the consumption
externalities are positive.  In physical infrastructure,  many of the
externalities are decidedly negative --  congestion in the use of electricity,
road and water services, damage caused to other users from a road that
deteriorates with each use, and, increasingly, pollution from road and water
traffic and some forms of power generation.
The discussion on pricing physical infrastructure has also been
influenced heavily by the fact that most investments have large fixed coste.
This means that, in many instances, marginal costs are below average costs, so
that some subsidy is required.  Also, while pricing at sh;rt-run marginal cost
would give the firm information about the appropriate time to invest (prices
would rise as the plant operated closer to capacity), the price rise at
capacity may be unacceptably high before further investment finally alleviates
the constraint.  Many argue (Anderson, 1989) that long-run marginal costs
would thus be a better guide, although this is not universally accepted.
There has been a widespread and longstanding recognition that prices
should play a role in resource allocation in physical infrastructure (unlike
human infrastructure).  The prices should be positive, and should approximate72
marginal costs, at least in the long run if not in the short run."  The
principles of sound demand management and the important role that prices play
in signaling the provider how much to invest are generally accepted.  But, for
many of the physical infrastructure sectors, present practice far from
reflects these principles.
Efficiency issues: raisina more revenue to cover supolv costs.  Recent
policy studies have found that, in practice, infrastructure prices in
developing countries have two disturbing general characteristics relative to
what is efficient --  they are too low and they are structured in a way that
does not reflect Xhe nuances of the various market failures mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs.
There is considerable evidence that present prices in most sectors are
very low and are below not only financial requirements but also marginal
costs.  Electric power is judged to be underpriced in most developing
countries.  Prices amount, on average, to just above a third of supply costs
and are half as much as those in industrial countries (World Bank, 1992b).
While consumers in most industrial countries pay all of the recurrent costs of
both water and sewerage services plus a large proportion of capital costs, in
developing countries, consumers pay much less.  For example, a recent review
of projects financed by the World Bank showed that the effective price paid
for water is only about 35 percent of the average cost of supplying it (World
Bank, 1992d; see also Katko 1990, Sampath 1992).
Some subsectors like ports, railways and telecommunications tend to be
run more autonomously as state-owned enterprises have a better record in these
sectors than in other sectors in implementing a cost-based tariff structure.
While the calculations regarding costs are admittedly crude, a selected review
of some countries where systematic data exist found that the ratio of revenues
to operating costs tended to exceed well over 100 percent for ports and to be
close to 100 percent for railways.  Cost recovery is also usually high in
"See, for example, a series of studies for the World Bank by Churchill
(1974), Walters  (1968), Bennathan  and Walters  (1979), Saunders  and Warford
(1976),  Saunders et al. (1983),  Turvey and Anderson (1977),  Bahl and Linn (1992)
and  Munasinghe  and  Warford  (1982),  which  cover  most  of  the  physical
infrastructure  sectors  with  which  institutions  work.73
telecommunications  (Julius  and  Alicbusan,  1989). Some  recent  analysts  have
defined  road  taxes  and  charges  broadly  --  including  the  purchase  tax  on
vehicles,  taxes  on diesel  fuel  and  gasoline  and license  fees,  au well  an tolls
and  other  direct  prices  --  and  have  ignored  any  pure  tax  elements  in
concluding  that  many  developing  countries  collect  considerably  more user
charges  than is spent  on roads  (Heggie,  1991). While  it is difficult  to
accept  the  assumption  that all  such  taxes  and  charges  can  be interpreted  as
user  charges,  even for  these  sectors,  the  efficiency  issue.  are  similar  to
those  posed  for  the sectors  that  experience  chronic  deficits. The
expenditures  fall  far  short  of what is  required  for  maintenance  (Anderson,
1989  and  Heggie,  1991). Moreover,  some  raise  the  question  of whether  price.
should  be increased  even  more,  given  that  other  methods  of revenue  raising  are
costly.
Given  these  initial  conditions,  the  magnitude  of the  revenues  that  can
be generated  by increasing  prices  can  be substantial.  Table  14 summarizes
some  calculations  made in  the  case  of  Africa  (Anderson,  1989). For
electricity  and  water,  the  gain  was computed  by assumLng  that an increase  in
the real  financial  rate  of return  of around  5  to 10  percent  was feasible. For
telecommunications,  actual  tariffs  were  compared  to long-run  marginal  costs.
For  roads,  a substantial  increase  in  user chargeo  of 50 to 75  percent  above
current  levels  appeared  justified  to take into  account  the  costs  of
maintenance. The calculations  imply  an increase  in revenue  of about
23 percent,  which  is sufficient  to cover  recurrent  costs  and  earn  adequate
financial  rates  of return. Moreover,  as most  of this  is Ln the form  of user
charges,  deadweight  losses  would  be low;  even  for  road  taxes,  elasticities  are
shown  to be relatively  small. Anderson  also  points  out  that raising  revenues
in this  way  would  ensure  the financial  autonomy  of institutions,  which  could
then  attract  private  capital  for  investment.74
Tabk 14. IncreaseNI  5ffectz  of Raising  Pc.k  sad Usr Osarge
Sub,Selaran Afi*a  (19850)
CIwAt  eonirlbutton  Potenil  Conlubutlen
Sedor  to pub&U  revenue  a  % of publ  reve
Elctoicity  Small  or negative  5-10
Water  Small  or negative  2-5
Telecommunioations  Marginl  5-10
Roads  10.15%  5-10
Source:  Andeson, D.  "The  Publio Revenue  and  Economic  Policy  in Afican Countries, World Bank  Diucwson Paper
No. 19, 1987.
Are  these  gains  feasible?  Anderson  states  thats
"The  financial  surpluses  from  marginal  costs  pricing  (and  also  from  any
infrastructure  taxes)  would  be  relatively  easy and  inexpensive  to
administer.  They  would  be  a  near  costless  part  of  the  billing  serviceas
for  electricity,  telecommunications  and  water  supply,  and  of the  user
charges  for  roads (license  fees,  parking  fees,  gasoline  taxes,  etc.)"
(p.  530).
Unfortunately,  he does  not  present  any  evidence  on this  point,  and  the issues
of calculating,  monitoring  and  administering  efficient  user  charges  remains  an
important  debating  area  in  the literature,  and  will be discussed  further  below
in  the  context  of addressing  externalities.
Does  this  mean  that infrastructure  prices  can  be a good instrument  for
general  revenue  raising,  given  the  high  deadweight  losses  associated  with
commodity  taxes?O If  these  charges  are  to be consldered  as an indirect  tax,
they should  be evaluated like  one.  The  case  of roads  has  been examined  in
this  way (Newbery,  1988). The  road  price  can  be considered  to have  two
elements: a  road  user  charge  to ensure  sectoral  efficLency  (in  other  words,
to  take  into  account  congestion  and  road  damage,  as  dLicussed  below)  and  a
pure  tax  element,  which  is  the  amount  by  which  road  taxes  exceed  road  use
cost.  If  the  economy  were  competitive  and  externalities  could  be  corrected, 4
'lieggie  (1991)  and Fon and Hoggle (1991)  advocate such a policy for
developing  countries. See  also  Laferriere  and  Nalo (1992),  Mwase (1988,  1989).
4These  meet  a  more  general  set  of  conditions  discussed  formally  by  Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971)  --  that production  efficiency  is feasible  and that any
resulting  private  profits  are  negligible  or can  be taxed  away.75
then  policies  should  be designed  to achieve  production  efficiency  and all
dlitortionary  taxes  should  fall  on final  consumers  (to  avoid  cascading  effects
of distortions).  Newbery  (1988)  points  out  that,  under  these  conditions,
"freight  transport  should  pay  the  efficient  road  user  charge;  passenger
transport  may  be subject  to additional  pure  taxation".  (p.  121)  The  latter  is
particularly  attractive  in light  of Deaton's  finding  (1987)  that household
spending  on gasoline  car  purchase  and  malntenance  li relatively  income-elastic
in  developing  countries  (see  also  Oum et  al,  1990).
Should  the  funds  be  earmarked  for  operations  and  maintenance,  given
that  so  many  recent  studies  pinpoint  this  as  the  most  important  priority  area
for  further  investment,  as  discussed  in  Section  3?  This  is  an  argument  made
by many  who  work  within  the  sectors  (see,  for  example,  Johanson,  1989),  while
analysts  and  policymakers  dealing  with  general  economics  feel  that  earmarking
is  a controversial  policy  subject. The  pros and  cons  of earmarking  are  beyond
the  purview  of this paper.< However,  some  general  principles  are  reasonably
clear. The  user charge  portion  of the  price  should  be spent  on expanding  or
maintaining  the infrastructure,  depending  on which  has  the  higher  return.
Revenues  from  the  tax  portion  of the  price  should  be treated  like  taxes  --
and,  if the  government  has  reasonable  expenditure  allocation  mechanisms,
operations  and  maintenance  should  be considered  along  with  other  worthwhile
investments. If not,  then  one  should  investigate  the  possibility  of removing
discretion  from  central  authorities  as  the  best  way  to achieve  better  resource
allocation.
Efficiencv  issues:  correcting  for  neaative  externalities.  Prices  in
physical  infrastructure  can  be used  to correct  for  the  principal  negative
externalities  imposed  by a user  on others:  congestion  (as  in the  decreasing
reliability  of power  supply  as more  users  are  connected  to the  grid),  damage
to the infrastructure  (as  in  road  damage  causing  higher  costs  of  maintenance
to the  public  authority  and  of repair  to other  vehicle  owners)  and,  in some
cases,  pollution. The  principles  are  reasonably  olear  for  each  of the
subsectors.
' 2 For  a good summary  of the  principal  issues,  see  McCleary,  1991.76
In road  transport,  the ideal  is  to charge  vehicles  the  cost  of using
the  road  each  time.  This  cost  will include  damage  and  congestion. Road
damage  is  relatively  straightforward  --  a combination  of vehicle-specific  and
distance-related  charges  (such  as on axles,  fuels,  vehicle  parts  or purchase
have  been suggested).4  Congestion  is  more  problematic  because  of the  large
differences  between  peak  and  off-peak  road  usage. Metering  can  be especially
difficult,  unless  some  new  electronic  technology  is developed  as has  been
tried  on a pilot  case in  Hong  Kong (see  Hau, 1990). Otherwise,  proxies  are
used as second-best  instruments.  One  of the  most  successful  has  been  access
charges  that  are  area-specific,  as has  been  tried  and  is still  in practice  in
Singapore  (see  Watson  and  Holland,  1976,  for  a thorough  evaluation). Fuel
taxes  are  a particularly  blunt  instrument  in this  regard  since  they  are
related  to distance  rather  than  congestion. one  simulation  of how  these
various  types  of  charges  can  be combined  are  summarized  for  commercial
vehicles  in Tunisia  in  Table  15.  The  table  shows  that  different  types  of
prices  will have  differential  impacts  on  various  types  of  vehicles.
4Small  et al. (1989)  and  Newbery  (1988).Tabk 15. Illustrative  Road User  Charges  for Commercial  Tlnsport In TnWsa, 1983
(Road use costs (U.S. cents per kilometer)
Diesel tax
Road  Non-urban  Urban  rate  Purchase tax
damage  congestion  congestion  Total  (U.S.cents  rate (percent)
Vehide class  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  per lUter)  (6)
(5)
Utility (pickup)  0.03  0.1S  1.46  1.64  18.22  26
Truck Class
Light  0.12  0.21  1.94  2.27  15.13  20
Medium  0.51  0.33  0.44  1.28  6.40  -4
Heavy Single  2.18  0.39  0.52  3.09  7.92  2
Heavy tandem  4.46  0.39  0.52  5.37  12.07  17
Articulated  5.64  0.41  0.44  0.44  13.33  11
a.  The rate needed  to cover road use costs fully through a tax on diesel.
b.  Tax scheme A stipulates  a diesel tax of six cents per liter, a tire tax of
10 percent, and a tax on parts 10 percent the purchase  tax rate is the rate needed to equate charge to
cost.
c.  Tax scheme B stipulates  a diesel tax of three cents per liter, a 20 percent tire tax, a 20 percent parts
tax, and a purchase tax as set; the balance  is the amount needed  to equate charge to cost (possible license
fee).
Source: Newbery, 1988.
Road  prices  have  implications  for  pollution  and,  depending  on the form
they  take,  on other  sectors  in  the economy. It has  been shown  that  the
pollution  externality  would  add  another  term  to the  optimal  price  formula.M
However,  there  have  been  no studies  that  explicitly  measure  how  a  charge  can
be made for  pollution  in  ro&d  pricing  in  developing  countries. Eskeland
(1992),  in  the context  of Mexico,  estimates  that  the  range  of instruments  to
do so  would  vary and  could  very  well include  regulatory  as well  as tax-related
"See Eskeland  and Jimenez (1992)  for an intuitive  explanation  and for
applications  to developing  countrieu.78
interventions.  Another consideration is that blunt instruments like fuel
taxes may have substantial repercussions elsewhere in the economy and, if go,
their effects should be taken into account. Studies by Hughes (1986) in
Indonesia, Thailand and Tunisia used an input-output table, a model of price-
shifting behavior and an estimated system of demand equations to analyze theme
effects.  The data requirements were obviously very heavy, for the study had
to be replicated in many other countries.
For water, the issues are rather different.  Here, the literature has
stressed the metering issue, particularly for irrigation where it is virtually
impossible to control who has access to the service.  One option is for the
government to deal with water users' aseociations (WUAs),  which are charged
with dealing and negotiating prices with the national irrigation authority.
The WUA then negotiates with individual farmers and monitors use locally.
Such schemes have worked well in the Philippines and elsewhere (World Bank
1988c).
Eauitv issues.  There have been relatively few studies of the impact of
various infrastructure pricing schemes on equity.  Since the majority of
infrastructure services are in urban areas and the distribution of income
favors those living in these areas, raising prices there will not affect the
poor as much as raising them elsewhere would do.  Even within urban areas,
coverage is often such that the rich are the ones who obtain accees.
For example, Table 7 has already shown that prices charged by private
water vendors in selected cities around the world are much higher than those
charged by public utilities, and it is often the poor who must buy water from
the former ano the rich who have connections to the latter.  This is partly
the reason that, in the few case studies in Latin American comparing the
incidence of various types of infrastructure intervention, urban-based water
subsidies are relatively regressive (Table  6b).  Thus, charging more for such
utilities may not be that regressive.
Moreover, recent researc.h  has found a high level of willingness to pay
even in rural areas (Briscoe  et al., 1993), although it is important to
distinguish among differont types of communities.  In studies of rural water
demand in Brazil, Haiti, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tanzania and Zimbabwe,79
researchers  used  both contingent  valuation  and  revealed  preference  methods  of
inference  to conclude  that  most rural  people  want and  are  willing  to pay for  a
relatively  high  level  of service  (yard  taps)  and  are  willing  to pay
substantially  more if  that  service  is reliable. In other  types  of
communities,  only  a  minority  of houueholds  are  willing  to pay  for  prlvate
connections,  but  most are  willing  to  pay  for  some  if not  all  of the  costs  of
public  connections. In some  of the  poorer  communities  where  supply  costs  are
high,  public  taps could  be subsidized.'
There  are  also  ways to protect  the  poor  by block  pricing  in  which
higher  unit  prices  are  charged  at higher  levels  of consumption,  as has  been
tried  in  Brazil,  Colombia  and  Indonesia  (World  Bank,  1988c). An extreme
example  of this  would  be a lifeline  rate in  which,  up to a certain  threshold,
consumption  is free  and  is charged  at  marginal  cost  thereafter. However,  such
charges  should  take into  account  patterns  of use.  The  poor  cculd  end  up
paying  higher  unit  prices  than  the  rich if  the former  relied  on communal  taps
(which  have  high  volumes)  and  the latter  relied  on private  taps (which  have
low  volumes). In such  a case (documented  in  the  case  study  by Whittington,
1990),  volume-based  pricing  would  not serve  the  poor as well.
For  road  taxes,  evidence  indicates  that,  in  transport,  some
combinations  of  instruments  are  neutral;  for  example,  gasoline  taxes  are
progressive  while  diesel  plus  kerosene  taxes  are  regressive  and  so  they
balance  each  other  out (Newbery,  1988).
Conclusions. For  physical  infrastructure,  unlike  in  education  and
health,  there  has  been  a longstanding  acceptance  that  prices  should  be set
high  enough  to cover  marginal  costs. The  main issues  have  to do  with
implementing  these  principles  --  particularly  in  practical  ways  to account  for
congestion  and  pollution  externalities;  metering  problems;  accounting  for
fiscal  realities  in pricing;  and  in adjusting  prices  to account  for
distributional  objective.
0The  study  also  identified  communities  where  the  willingness  to pay  for  any
kind  of  improved  service  is  low  becauce  traditional  water  supplies  are  relatively
easy  to  get  or  the  prczvision  of  this  service  is seen as the  financial
responsibility  of  government.so
5  vumearv  and  Future  DirectLons
The  recent  literature  has  reinforced  the  point  that human  and  phyaical
infrastructure  are  critical  elements  for  economic  growth  and for  the reduction
of poverty. Despite  data limitations  and  methodological  difficulties,  studies
espousing  these  ideas,  briefly  reviewed  in  Section  2, have  permeated  the
formulation  and  application  of policies,  as practiced  by governments  and  as
supported  by international  funding  agencies.
There  is  also  a  continuing  recognition  that,  because  of externalLtLes,
scale  economies,  other  public  goods  characteristics,  and  because  of
distributional  objectives,  the  government  has  a key  role  to play in financing
and  supplying  infrastructure.  But  recent  studies  summarized  in  Section  3 have
raised  fundamental  concerns  with  how  such  intervention  has  been  practiced.
The efficiency  objective  is often  not  met --  the  hLghest  return  investments
are not  being  given  priority;  and  the  services  that  are  being  provided  are not
being  provided  at least  cost.  Even  more alarming  is  the fact  that,  despite
spirited  rhetoric  and  clearly  stated  national  goals  to ensure  access  to all,
but  especially  the poor,  the  equity  objective  is often  not  met  either. At the
root  of those  failures  are  constraints  that  are  often  neglected  in  planning
models:  administrative  capacity  of government  is  weak;  rents  are  often  sought
and  obtained  by private  interest  groups,  leading  to distorted  outcomeas
operational  tools  to implement  conceptual  sound  advice  are  often  lacking.
But  what  then  can  be  done  to  ensure  that  infrastructure  services  are
more  adequately  financed  and  that  what  is  3pent  is  better  directed  towards
priority  investments?  The recent  literature  on these  issues  is vast  and
diverse,  even  within  each  of the sectors  that  can  be classified  as
"infrastructure."4  Section  3  presented  selected  examples  of how recelved
textbook  analysi Ls  belng  revislted  in  the  policy  debate,  only some  of whlch
is  backed  by rigorous  and  empirically-based  analysis. Recent  initiatives  have
"Moreover,  many  of  the  papers  are  interesting  and  policy-relevant  but  cannot
be  classified  as  scholarly  research  --  they  tend  to  be  position  papers,  although
many are indeed  based on rigorous  background  studies.  See, for  example,  the
recent  World  Develooment  Reports  of the  World  Bank.81
attempted to relieve the two main constraints to sound public decisLon-making
- a lack of information and a lack of incentives.  These initiatives have
included refining economic tools of analysis, particularly those for making
inter-sectoral allocation decisions in spending and those that take into
account general policies in setting sectoral policies, building better
incentives into investment choices, particularly through decentralization, and
allowing for greater private sector provision in certain subsectors, while
ensuring that the government maintains an important regulatory role.
Pricing reform is another of the policy initiatives that has recently
been given much attention.  Once a government has decided where to invest, it
must then decide how much to charge for the use of that service.  Section 4
focused on the recent literature on pricing reform, which fundamentally
revisits the public-private balance in the financing of infrastructure.  There
has been an after emotional debate about pricing those services that produce
human capital, since education and health have traditionally been provided for
free by the public sector.  In physical infrastructure, the issues are
somewhat different.  In transport, energy and, to a lesser extent, water,
pricing to achieve economic efficiency has always been accepted in principle.
However, the principles have traditionally not been applied so the recent
literature on these sectors has also focused on the need for reform.
This review has also identified key areas for future research.  First
is the need to improve data quality and availability.  At the aggregate level,
the empirical link between infrastructure and productivity can be strengthened
with improved measures of outcomes (particularly in human resources).  At the
household level that combines information about socioeconomic characteristics
of consumers as well as their access and use of infrastructure.
Second, while there have been major recent advances, there is a need to
apply more widely and selectively econometric corrections to problems
regarding selectivity and simultaneity bias.  This includes research in topics
such as the microeconomic link between productivity and infrastructure, as
well as in behavioral studies of household demand for infrastructure services.
For example, there are relatively few studies using such corrections showing
how roads, power and other forms of physical infrastructure affect82
productivity  of firms  and  household  welfare. Also,  more  research  would  be
useful  on how  household  utilization  of physical  and  human  infrastructure
services  are  affected  by changes  in  price  and  quality,  the  most important
variables  affected  by government  policy.
Third,  some  key areau  remain  relatively  unexplored  empirically. For
example,  estimates  of  the  benefit  incidence  of  infrastructure  services
generally  do not  adjust  for  household  behavior. This  may  be important  if
private  transfers  are  affected  by public  transfers  thus  influencing  the  net
lmpact  of receivers  of publicly  subsidized  infrastructure.  Another  example  of
a  relatively  unexplored  area  is how  decentralizsd  proviLion  of infrastructure
--  whether by local public Lnstitutions or by private firms --  can affect
efficiency  and  equity.
Fourth,  some  conceptual  issues  remain  to be solved. These  include
political  economy  questlons  and  how policy  recommendations  may  change  when
endogenous  government  behavior  is  taken  into  account.  Another  issue  is  to
develop  analytical  tools  to address  the issue  of intersectoral  allocation.
Finally,  given  that  much  of infrastructure  will continue  to be provided  or
regulated  by public  institutions,  there  is  a need  to look  into  the  incentive
framework  influencing  such  sectors.83
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ADD ONsInsert the ff on the role of externalities in policys
These ideas have important implications for policy, such as investment
in infrastructure.  The traditional growth models implied that economic policy
had a limited role.  The rate of per capita growth is determined only by the
exogenously determined rate of technical change --  the economic forces
determinlng that change are not expltined by the early models.  Thus,
"economic policy only affects the level of economic oLtput or the transition
to the steady state" (Easterly et al. 1992, p. 41).  In the "new growth"
literature, economic policy, such as investment in human infrastructure, is
crucial in this process because without it, the amount of private investment
wLll be insufficient to sustain growth, as private agents do not take the
external effects of their actions into account in their investmer.c  decisions.
The most effective policies are those that address the external'ties
directly.49
Why new growth is important to policy:
some of which have important implicatione for economic policy.  For example,
Those who employ'ad hoc models of economic growth, in which long-term growth
over a 25-year period is regressed on initial income and human capital stock
(Barro 1991, Barro Sala i Martin 1991) find that the latter has a positive and
significant effect when both are included.  This is generally taken to be a
test for the convergence hypothesis, although some recent work by Easterly et
al. (1992) sugges..s  that the results are not conclusive.  Those who derive
estimating equations from aggregate production functions tend to got
insigrificant results on education, unless the equation takes into account
differences in levels of human capital (Romer 1990, Kyriacou 1991, Lau et al.
1991).  This is taken to be verification of the Azariadis and Drazen (1990)
conjecture that ach:.eving  threshold levels of human capital may be important
in obtaining significan.t  results.
To externality section:
This argument hinges on identifying those infrastructure services which
require less public involvement than is now the case.  There is no "uniquely"
correct public/private balance.  It depends on the characteristics of the good
or service and the country conditions.  Easterly (1992)  disentangles the
effects by sector of economic activity and concludes that investments in truly
public goods have a positive effect and significant effect.
From the conclusions:  EDITED BY FIORA AND CORRECTED BY IaRTA
While public investment must continue to play a key role in providing
infrastructure, there is much room to improve its performance. Present
spending can be made more efficient by directing it towards high return
activities and categories, unit costs can be lowered and subsidies can be
directed more specifically towards the poor.  But in making policy reforms the
reasons why deficiencies exist in developing countries must be considered.
For example providing better tools of analysis for making cross-sectoral
fRecent  studies broaden the categories of what should be clagsified as
"productive"  -- for  example, including  education, health and even defence (Barro
1990).  Studies that use cross-country data  on public spending sometimes produce
conflicting  evidence from  that  use "outcome"  variables,  which could  have dramatic
implications for policy if shown to be robust (will  be 'returned  to below).96
choices  and  providing  better  incentives  to public  providers  by decentralizing
some  responsibility  to lower  tiers  of government  and  even  the  private  sector
would  help  to improve  the  situation  in  most  d.c.  In addition,  selective
pricing  reform  could  raise  the  resources  needed  for  high-return  investments
without  unduly  hurting  the  poor.  There  are limits  to thiu,  however  full  cost
recovery  is not  desirable  in the  case  of certain  services,  particularly  thoeo
for  which  complementary  financial  markets  are  lacking,  and further  work is
needed  on the  behavioral  response  of users  and  providers  to the  policy  change.
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